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Abstract 
When studying the party system formation in post-communist Lithuania, the Western 
European theoretical framework is a useful, although not sufficient tool to understand this 
process. Weak alignments between voters and parties and unstable party systems have made it 
difficult to apply the Western European theoretical framework because it prerequisites a high 
degree of party institutionalisation. In addition to unstable electoral support for the established 
parties, new parties successfully emerge, but disappear, then change name, splinter and merge 
with other parties.  
 
This thesis introduces the Reversed cleavage model, which is an attempt to study cleavages in 
a post-communist setting, exemplified with the urban-rural cleavage in Lithuania. Instead of 
focusing upon continuous representation of political parties, the Reversed cleavage model 
applies cleavage continuity as a point of departure. The unstable party system in Lithuania is 
thereby not related to voters’ missing perception of cleavages, but to the parties’ inability to 
establish long-lasting alignments with the electorate. Party system formation along the urban-
rural cleavage in post-communist Lithuania, is explained by shifting parties and constant 
cleavage.   
 
Keywords: Party system formation, Lithuania, urban-rural cleavage, Reversed cleavage 
model  
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Introduction 
Can a stable cleavage structure persist alongside an unstable party system? By studying the 
urban-rural cleavage in post-communist Lithuania, this thesis will argue that cleavages can 
structure the voters’ party preferences without this leading to stable party systems. 
 
Lithuania held its fifth post-communist election to parliament in October 2004 and the 
outcome confirmed the trend from earlier elections; the party system is unstable, characterised 
by volatile support for the established parties and an immediate electoral success for party 
newcomers. This makes it difficult to identify patterns of party-voter alignments because 
these are not reflected in continuity on party level.    
 
The study of party systems is related to the degree of openness (unpredictability) or closeness 
(predictability) of the party competition (Millard 2004: 130). The structure of the party 
competition is further concerned with thresholds for entering the party scene, how parties are 
related to each other and how the parties are linked to the electorate. Three approaches have 
been predominant in the study of party systems, none of them mutually excluding the others. 
The first approach has focused upon socio-structures as sources of cleavage alignments 
between voters and parties. The second approach has emphasised institutional factors and the 
last approach highlights the role of actors (Millard 2004: 4). It is important to underline that 
there is no definitive divide between these three approaches, although one can argue that they 
each have a main focus; cleavages, institutional factors or actors.  
 
This theoretical framework origin from studies of party systems in Western Europe and is a 
useful, although not sufficient, tool to understand political development also outside the core 
Western hemisphere, such as post-communist Lithuania. By focusing upon Lipset and 
Rokkan’s cleavage model, present its content, inner mechanisms and elaborate upon relevant 
critique and alternative explanations, such as institutional factors and agency, the aim is to 
build a model that fit the conditions for party system formation in Lithuania. The most 
important precondition in the Reversed cleavage model is that societal conflicts survive the 
political parties and therefore represent continuity.  
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The Reversed cleavage model 
Lipset and Rokkan’s cleavage model was designed to explain the stable party systems in 
Western Europe. Parties simply persisted because of the stable alignments between parties 
and voters through socio-structured cleavages. These alignments were further strengthened by 
parties’ ability to generate and define new conflicts into their party substance. Party stability 
thereby became Lipset and Rokkan’s keyword when explaining the party systems in Western 
Europe.  
 
In post-communist Lithuania, and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in general, the party 
system has been more unstable. Highly volatile support for established parties and immediate 
electoral success for new parties make it difficult to apply Lipset and Rokkan’s theoretical 
framework, simply because their model was designed to explain stable party systems. The 
study of cleavages in a post-communist setting with shifting parties has either lead to the 
conclusion of cleavages being absent, or that the cleavage structure is fluid. The Reversed 
cleavage model introduces a new perspective in understanding post-communist party-voter 
alignments, exemplified with the study of an urban-rural cleavage in Lithuania. By reversing 
the theoretical preconditions of Lipset and Rokkan, the Reversed cleavage model confronts 
scholars arguing that the cleavage structure over time will generate stable party systems in 
CEE (Bakke 2002: 20, Kitschelt 1992). The argument raised in this thesis is that unstable 
party systems are not the result of voters’ weak perception of cleavages, but rather of parties’ 
inability to represent these cleavages by establishing long-lasting alignments with the 
electorate.  
 
The volatile voter behaviour is thereby a reflection of the fluid party configurations, and not 
the consequence of cleavages’ inability to structure voters’ party preferences. Parties can still 
be regarded as representatives of the cleavage, but the duration and strength of the party-voter 
alignment is limited and weak. New parties can emerge as new cleavage representatives under 
very favourable conditions. This thesis will study the urban-rural cleavage in Lithuania and 
argue that despite shifting parties, the cleavage structure can be seen as stable.  
Urban-rural cleavage in Lithuania 
The urban-rural cleavage can be assumed to be present in Lithuania because of the many 
farmers and a huge rural population in the country. This cleavage should at least theoretically 
have the capacity to structure party competition (Duvold and Jurkynas 2004: 149, Tavits 
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2005: 288). But scholars have not found evidence supporting this assumption. Lithuania has 
been considered by many scholars, such as Berglund, Ekman and Aarebrot (2004), Duvold 
and Jurkynas (2004) Bakke (2002) and Holm-Hansen (2002), to have a relatively stable party 
system structured along the left-right cleavage, not an urban-rural cleavage. The electorate’s 
fluctuation between the different parties, and the recent success of new parties, weakens the 
arguments of an emerging stable party system in Lithuania.   
Structure of the thesis 
Chapter 1, 2 and 3 constitute the theoretical discussion of party system formation in this 
thesis. This theoretical discussion touches upon three main approaches to party system 
formation; cleavages, institutional factors and agency. Chapter 1 elaborates first of all Lipset 
and Rokkan’s cleavage model, presents relevant critique and discusses alternative 
explanations to party system formation, such as institutional factors and agency. Chapter 2 
examines the conditions for studying party system formation in a post-communist setting. 
Building upon the discussion in Chapter 1 and 2, Chapter 3 presents the theoretical 
framework of the Reversed cleavage model. This model aims to explain the party system 
formation along the urban-rural cleavage in Lithuania by assuming shifting parties and 
constant cleavages. Chapter 4 elaborates the conditions for an urban-rural cleavage in 
Lithuania and introduces the post-communist party system developments. Chapter 5 accounts 
for the analysis’ methodological considerations, while Chapter 6 presents and discusses the 
findings.  
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Chapter 1  
Cleavages, Institutional factors and 
Agency 
 
The study of party system formation has mainly been concerned with three explanations; 
cleavages, institutional factors and agency (Millard 2004: 4, Ware 1996: 185). These three 
approaches are by no means decisive, but they indicate the variables receiving most attention 
form the scholars.  This chapter examines these three approaches to party system formation, 
with special attention on the cleavage model of Lipset and Rokkan.  Lipset and Rokkan aimed 
to explain the origin and processes leading to stable party systems in Western Europe by 
pointing to how parties emerged and why they survived. Their model has been criticized by 
many scholars, both regarding the theoretical framework, and their model’s validity and 
generality. Lastly this chapter looks into alternative explanations for party system formation 
and party survival. Here, institutional factors and the role of agency provide different 
explanations to this process.  
1.1 The Lipset and Rokkan cleavage model 
Lipset and Rokkan’s aim were to “… account for the emergence of single parties (and) to 
analyze the processes of alliance formation that led to the development of stable party systems 
of political organizations in country after country” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 35). Central 
questions of their study were why party systems emerged, why they differed and what 
mechanisms explained their survival. It was a study of variations in macrostructures explained 
by the origin, variations, stability and the continuous equilibrium in different multi party 
systems in Western Europe (Larsen 2003: 39, Berntzen and Selle 1988: 245).  
 
By unveiling the historical roots of the party structure in Western Europe, Lipset and Rokkan 
connected the origin of each party to alliance formation under so-called ”critical junctures” in 
the state-and nation- building phase (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 36-38). These critical junctures 
were societal conflicts evolving around the centre-periphery and the culture-economy axis, 
and created the conditions for social division. This social division further constituted the 
foundation for the establishment of political parties. The patterns of interests and societal 
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conflicts were represented by parties over time, and the party system, according to Lipset and 
Rokkan, was derived from historical conditions of national and socioeconomic development 
(Dalton 1988: 128). Parties established stable alliances to the electorate through cleavages.   
 
Party alternatives were mobilised along cleavages aligning certain voter groups to certain 
parties. Lipset and Rokkan’s main point was that these party-voter alignments lasted (frozen), 
and party stability thereby became their keyword. “(T)he party systems of the 1960s reflect, 
with few significant exceptions, the cleavage structures of the 1920’s” (Lipset and Rokkan 
1967: 50). “Once cleavages were translated (…) into party systems during critical junctures 
(…) they were frozen (…) for a very long term” (Colomer and Puglisi 2005: 503). New 
parties could not emerge because party-voter alignments were stable; the voter simply 
supported the same party in several elections (Zielinski 2002: 193). All political alternatives 
were fully mobilised and the balance between the parties that had been established in the 
1920s persisted. Parties’ ability to freeze alignments with subgroups of the electorate through 
cleavages, resulted in stable environment for political competition since all political 
alternatives were mobilised and aligned to the voters. No new party families emerged between 
1920s and the 1960s (Ware 1996: 225), and the result was stable party systems. 
 
Although concentrating upon patterns of social structures as determinants, it is important to 
underline the presence of a dynamic element within the Lipset and Rokkan theoretical 
framework. This can be an argument against accusations about “determinism” within their 
model (Colomer and Puglisi 2005: 503, Luther and Müller-Rommel 2002: 4, Berntzen and 
Selle 1988). Lipset and Rokkan (1967) did predict that the stability of voter preferences and 
support to political parties would change in the future, resulting in more fluctuations than 
before. Their main point was that party-voter alignments were built up as a response to major 
social and economical developments. In this process agency and institutionalisation mattered. 
There was an interaction between political development and socioeconomic structures 
(Dalton, Flanagan, Beck 1984: 455), and this political development had to be conducted by 
someone. Lipset and Rokkan saw parties as principal agents of transforming societal conflicts 
into political divisions because “…cleavages do not translate themselves into party 
oppositions as a matter of course” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 26). When the critical junctures 
appeared elites made strategic choices within the scope of the existing institutional 
framework, but the social structures limited or accelerated the conflict potential. Certain 
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structures created a wider range of possibilities for agency, which further explains the 
variations of structures (Larsen 2003: 48, Berntzen and Selle 1988: 247).  
 
Lipset and Rokkan’s cleavage model can therefore be said to have accounted for both actors 
and institutions in combination with social structures to explain the party formation process. 
However, the alignments between voters and parties occurred within a context where they 
gave most attention to the structural aspect.    
1.1.1 The cleavage concept 
The cleavage concept is central in the theoretical framework of Lipset and Rokkan’s cleavage 
model. Although the concept is widely used in the literature of political science it is hardly 
well-defined by any scholars. Even Lipset and Rokkan never really defined the cleavage 
concept themselves and used confusing synonyms like “conflicts”, “interests” and 
“oppositions” (Aardal 1994: 219). Still, the title of their famous piece “Party Systems and 
Voter Alignments” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) explains at least the core idea of their notion of 
what a cleavage can be: a connection between voter preferences and party alternatives. These 
voter preferences may be shaped within more or less cohesive groups of voters based upon a 
common identity on territorial location, language, religion, economical position etc. A 
cleavage is therefore something in-between the voter and the party and constitutes the raw 
material of political competition, which parties seek to exploit (Berntzen and Selle 1988: 250, 
Zielinski 2002: 189). Voters aligned to certain parties through cleavages, reflecting the social 
division. Thereby, the social division constituted the point of Lipset and Rokkan’s departure 
towards structuration of political competition.  
 
According to Lipset and Rokkan five central cleavages, structured along the centre-periphery 
and economy-culture axis, had shaped the political landscape of Western Europe. Stable 
alignments between parties and electorate resulted in stable party systems in the region. The 
development of cleavages had a dynamic that was interlinked with the outcome of prior 
cleavages. Who won/who lost, which alliances existed before/after affected the conditions 
surrounding the origin and outcome of the next cleavage (Ware 1996: 186). This adding up of 
societal conflicts could either reinforce or cross-cut the existing cleavage pattern (Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967: 10). For instance, the economic cleavage between labour and capital had a 
tendency to cut across the territorial cleavage, between centre and periphery. This created 
social bases for new alliances and party constellations, dividing old constellations. The five 
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cleavages Lipset and Rokkan suggested are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1: Lipset and Rokkan’s cleavages 
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Source: Flora 1992: 123 
 
The cleavage concept deals not just with the voter’s alternatives and interests in one particular 
political issue. The cleavage in itself can evolve around one central political issue, such as 
labour vs. capital, but the concept exceeds this main political question and refers to a wide 
range of other issues as well. For instance, conflicting attitudes towards private vs. public 
school founding might be traced back to the cleavage emanating from labour vs. capital. This 
cleavage channels corresponding attitudes towards other issues as well, like school founding. 
The electorate identifying themselves as the “labour branch” would probably be more 
supportive towards public school founding because it would correspond with the attitudes 
reflecting their belonging in the labour vs. capital cleavage.    
 
The notion of political packages covers this approach, which more or less prerequisites that 
there exist a primary extensive cleavage that defines other issues into the underlying logic of 
this cleavage. The cleavage concept therefore refers to a set of attitudes in different political 
issues which are combined and explained by the voter’s preferences given by structures. 
Other conflicts, which may be essential in the political landscape and of personal value of the 
voter, overlap with the core logic of the main cleavage. We can simply say that a cleavage 
incorporates values and aspects related to other conflicts and issues as well, and integrate 
them into the “bounded rationality” of the cleavage.                
Developing the cleavage concept 
Other scholars have developed the understanding of what a cleavage is, especially to better 
illustrate the mechanisms between voter preferences and party formation. Bartolini and Mair 
(1990) built a more dynamic theoretical approach to study the linkage between voter, conflict 
and party. They claimed that the cleavage concept consisted of three levels; empirical, 
normative and organisational. The socio-structural conflict pattern constituted the empirical 
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level. Values, identity, interests and attitudes were central components within the normative 
level, while collective action resulting in institutions, like political parties, represented the 
organisational level. Their definition of a cleavage had to fulfil all three levels, simply stating 
that structures had to generate attitudes resulting in organisation of a political party (Skare 
1998: 177). One central point of Bartolini and Mair’s model was the continuous interaction 
between the different levels. Parties must respond to demands from the bottom. The party 
expressed and represented the cleavage but without being fully independent from its empirical 
level.  
 
Whitefield’s (2002) study of cleavages in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe 
combined Lipset-Rokkan and Bartolini-Mair. His cleavage definition emphasised the 
interaction between divisions found in the electorate with divisions among political actors: 
“Political cleavages are conceived of here as strongly structured and persistent lines of salient 
social and ideological division among politically important actors” (Whitefield 2002: 181). 
Although this definition can be contested and criticised for being too wide and unclear, 
Whitefield highlighted the corresponding division between structures and actors as a helpful 
tool to understand how the cleavage concept can be viewed. The interests and preferences 
found on the socio-structural level correspond with ideological division among political 
actors. The problem however is that the definition does not say anything about the causal 
mechanisms between those two levels since it focuses overwhelmingly upon correlating 
division among political actors.   
Loyalty and size 
Loyalty was more important than the actual party’s size for indicating a cleavage’s presence 
in the Lipset and Rokkan perspective. For instance, the size of the minority population may 
decrease or increase as a percentage of the total population over time in a given country, but 
the party loyalty among the minority group was decisive when measuring the presence of an 
ethnically defined cleavage within the party system. It was not the actual number of voters the 
party was able to receive from the total electorate, but the number of voters within its 
potential electorate.  
 
The Swedish minority in Finland might decrease from ten to five percent of the total Finnish 
electorate, but the presence of an ethnic cleavage between Swedes and Finns depends on how 
large share of the Swedes who actually support the Swedish People's Party in Finland (SFP), 
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the ethnical Swedish based party. One might argue that because, hypothetically, SFP reduces 
its support from one election to the next, this cleavage is becoming less relevant for the 
structuration of Finnish party politics. But although parties defined to represent the ethnic 
cleavage attract a smaller share of the Finnish electorate, the decisive element, according to 
the Lipset and Rokkan, was the loyalty percentage within the minority group1. Parties’ ability 
to maintain continuous support from a potential subgroup of the electorate was important for 
its survival and for the cleavage presence.  
 
Lipset and Rokkan, Bartolini and Mair, and Whitefield applied, in one way or another, the 
organisational expression of the cleavage, namely political parties, to indicate a cleavage’s 
presence. This might constitute a problem when studying cleavages in settings where party 
systems are regarded as unstable. Parties as cleavage indicators illustrate a central problem 
regarding the theoretical preconditions when measuring cleavage presence. This topic will be 
further discussed in Chapter 2.  
1.1.2 Parties’ ability to survive 
Parties played an important role in Lipset and Rokkan’s cleavage model since they constituted 
the continuous element of their theoretical framework. Although parties could be traced back 
to certain cleavages, representing social division emanating from critical junctures, the parties 
themselves were actors within the party system. They represented, presented and operated 
according to a wide range of political issues and constellations of alternatives. Parties’ 
function extended the role of just being cleavage representatives. If parties were totally 
dependent of the cleavage, they would disappear when the cleavage conflict was solved or 
defined within the party system. But they did not; parties survived political and institutional 
hurdles because they had a historical baggage since they emerged before and during the 
mobilisation of the mass electorate in Western Europe (Dalton et al. 1984: 459).  
Shifting cleavages, constant parties 
Parties do not simply present themselves de novo to the citizen at each election: they each have a 
history and so have the constellations of alternatives they present to the electorate (Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967: 2). 
 
Parties were older than the electorate and represented the constant element of Lipset and 
Rokkan’s theoretical framework by being the continuous, institutional expression of the 
                                                 
1
 Another example would be parties representing farmers and the interests of the agricultural sector. 
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cleavage. They explained this continuity by arguing that parties in Western Europe had a 
unique ability to survive their original conflicts by creating its own bounded rationality. 
Parties defined arising conflicts and issues into this rationality provided by their cleavage 
belonging (Marks and Wilson 2000). By absorbing new conflicts within the rationality of the 
party’s cleavage origin of the past, parties were able to survive as organisations and thereby 
generating expectations about the future (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 3).  
 
The continuity was found on party level because political parties seldom committed suicide; 
instead they generated and defined new societal conflicts (cleavages) when the old, original 
conflict was solved or defined within the party system. New cleavages were absorbed into the 
already existing party substance. The party systems can therefore, once they are established, 
“act as independent systems of channelment propelled by their own laws of inertia” (Larsen 
2003: 49, with reference to Sartori 1969: 90). This does not mean that the parties were totally 
independent of the cleavage itself, but the inner organisational strength of Western European 
political parties, the strong links to certain sectors within the society and the parties’ ability to 
generate new conflict patterns, were distinctive features to explain the survival of single 
parties and the stability of party systems observable in this region (Ware 1996: 188, 213).  
 
Decades of structural change and economical growth have made old, established alternatives 
increasingly irrelevant, but the high level of organizational mobilization of most sectors of the 
community has left very little leeway for a decisive breakthrough of new party alternatives (Lipset 
and Rokkan 1967: 54).  
 
The abovementioned reference to Lipset and Rokkan shows how the inner organisational 
strength of established parties enabled them to interpret new issues within the framework of 
existing cleavages. This made it difficult for new party alternatives to emerge, thereby 
preserving the existing political parties. According to Lipset and Rokkan, one can argue that 
the Western European party system, because of the parties’ ability to survive by redefining 
and generating new conflicts into their party substance, was characterised by shifting 
cleavages, constant parties. 
 
For instance, the conservative parties have survived as a party family by generating and 
redefining new societal issues and conflicts into its party substance. These parties originated 
from opposing the liberal ideas of the French revolution. The conservative parties were 
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founded to support the King and the nobility and especially concerning the economic field 
they were against liberalisation of trade (Layton-Henry 1982: 7). Today one might argue that 
the same conservative parties are the main advocates of free market economical policy, 
directly opposing the policy of its founding fathers. The parties have redefined the political 
agenda of its political substance adjusting themselves to the new societal and economical 
conditions. Since the parties in Western Europe are able of surviving its original conflicts and 
generating new, the structures are observable on party level generating stable party systems, 
as Lipset and Rokkan pointed out.   
Alternative theories on party survival   
While Lipset and Rokkan pointed to the parties’ ability to generate and extend the cleavage 
potential as an important feature to explain party survival, other scholars have presented 
alternative explanatory models. The catch-all party, electoral-professional party and cartel 
party introduced other perspectives to understand how parties survived2.  
 
Instead of cultivating the conflict potential of the cleavage by defining and generating new 
issues, as Lipset and Rokkan saw as central for party survival in their model, Kirchheimer 
(1966) pointed to party elite’s ability to tone down political conflicts as an instrument to reach 
a broader part of the electorate, and thereby survive. By reducing the conflict potential of the 
cleavage, parties transformed from ideological member-based organisations to electoral based 
catch-all parties. Hoping for benefits or fearing losses on election day, parties themselves 
opted to accommodate to its competitor’s successful style, if not catching all the strategy at 
least intended to catch the maximum number of voters (Kirchheimer 1966: 192). Although 
Kirchheimer certainly saw this process of party change as elite driven, he also accounted for 
the structures operating within the party system by arguing that “…tradition and the pattern of 
social and professional stratification (that) may set limits and offer potential audiences to the 
party’s appeal” (ibid: 186). The cleavage was important since it structured the competition 
between political parties, but the argument raised by Kirchheimer was that party survival was 
the result of party elites moving closer to each other along this axis.  
 
Panebianco (1988: 269) argued that Kirchheimer’s approach only implicitly treated the 
increasing professionalism of party organisations. The parties developed into more electoral 
oriented organisations (Katz and Mair 1994: 2). This meant that the earlier member-based 
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 These models were more focused upon the continuation and party survival, not emergence as such.   
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mass parties now was characterised by “electoral-professionalism”, involving a weakened 
position of the party in every arena. Parties’ ideological identity, collateral activity and party 
bureaucrats had been replaced by single issues, weakened vertical ties and personalised 
leadership (ibid: 264).  
 
The parties’ access to state resources and their position to conduct institutional engineering 
were regarded as important instruments for party survival in Katz and Mair’s (1995) notion of 
a “cartel party”.  The access to state power gave certain parties favourable conditions to 
secure their own survival through financial support, positions and public commissions. The 
competition between parties was replaced with elite cooperation, establishing party cartels 
protecting each other.   
1.2 Critique of Lipset and Rokkan  
The Lipset and Rokkan model has by no mean been immune to critique. The critique will here 
be treated under two subgroups; the first relates to the theoretical framework, prerequisites 
and assumptions in their model. Although Lipset and Rokkan were said to account for the role 
of actors within their framework, Berntzen and Selle (1988) argued that the theoretical 
framework of their cleavage model was deterministic, limiting to the role of agency. The 
second subgroup can be approached as a post Lipset-Rokkan critique, dealing with the 
validity and generality of their model and how it should be applied. This critique relates to the 
cleavages’ ability to structure party competition, a topic that was actualised with the 
increasing party system instability in Western Europe towards the end of the 1970s.  
1.2.1 Actors and structures 
Berntzen and Selle (1988: 246) argued that Lipset and Rokkan had an undefined, conflicting 
relationship to the role of actors in their model. This was a result of their structural-functional 
retrospective design where Lipset and Rokkan failed to combine the micro-macro level they 
claimed their sociological approach represented. Lipset and Rokkan were accused of deciding 
the outcome, overemphasising the structural element and neglecting agency-centered 
explanations and institutional factors (Ware 1996: 189). The main problem was the premise 
for the analysis. Lipset and Rokkan’s aim was to search for historical variables to explain the 
political outcome, not to identify the different alternatives available at the given time in 
history. Thereby they were accused of neglecting the intentions and interests of the actors 
involved in the process of party formation when the development took place.  
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Berntzen and Selle argued that the actors in Lipset and Rokkan’s model were just externally 
“added” to play the part that structural conditions a priori expected them to play. It was the 
function of the actors and not their intention that justified their presence in the model. The 
actors filled out the dynamic element within in their model, but their choices and actions were 
limited by the socio-structural developments given by the model. This meant that the actors’ 
qualitatively, substantial and ideological content lost its meaning because the actors’ function 
was more important than their intention. The function of the Counterculture movements in 
being opponents to the Centre became more important than the content of the counter-policy 
they actually represented (Berntzen and Selle 1988: 259). The model thereby lacked an 
obvious separation between why an act was possible and why it actually was carried out. It 
thereby became difficult to circle out the independent variable since the outcome already was 
decided by the structural-functional retrospective design.      
1.2.2 Post Lipset-Rokkan critique  
The Lipset and Rokkan theoretical framework had the intention of explaining party system 
formation and stability through party-voter cleavage alignment. In addition they suggested 
that that these alignments were frozen in Western Europe Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 3, 54). 
The model therefore predicted stability, not changes. The generality of this statement has 
generated a lot of debate that essentially boils down to a methodological question; is the 
frozen alignment statement an empirical observation made at two separate points in time 
(1920s and 1960s) or is it a general hypothesis about cause and effect over time? (Larsen 
2003: 46, Mair 1997: 4). An extreme interpretation of this statement would involve an absent 
of change (Dalton: 1988: 131). This would give each party the same percentage support in 
every election simply because the alignment is frozen.  
 
Towards the end of the 1970s the Western European party system was regarded as more 
unstable. Emergence of new parties and decline of old established ones with increasing 
electoral volatility, were put forward as evidences of a more fluid political environment3. The 
frozen alignment assumption was not sufficient to explain the party fractionalisation and 
increasing electoral volatility in Western Europe towards since it predicted stability, not 
changes (Kitschelt 1992: 10). The party system changes were not structured along the 
cleavages Lipset and Rokkan suggested. Scholars questioned the cleavages’ ability to 
                                                 
3
 It is worth mention that the literature on party decline is highly contested. The traditional Lipset and Rokkan 
parties are still important in the Western European party system (Ware 1996: 378).    
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structure the party competition (Dalton, Flanagan and Beck 1984: 11). This resulted in what 
we can call Post Lipset-Rokkan critique which further can be divided into two approaches. 
The first represented scholars supporting the theoretical framework of the Lipset and Rokkan 
model, but suggested a realignment of the party system in the sense that the changes reflected 
the structuring capacity of new or other cleavages than the ones Lipset and Rokkan operated 
with. The second approach questioned the cleavages’ capacity to structure party competition 
at all, a dealignment. These two contradicting approaches related differently to the very notion 
of cleavages. The first acknowledged the Lipset and Rokkan theoretical framework, but 
argued that other or new cleavages structured the party competition. The latter was more 
sceptical to the notion of cleavages as such, and focused upon other independent explanatorily 
variables.  
Realignment – new cleavages 
The literature on cleavage realignment represented first of all a respond to the frozen 
alignment assumption of Lipset and Rokkan, and an update of their model as such. The party 
systems changes in Western Europe during the 1970s and 1980s, with emerging parties and 
the old ones experiencing decreasing electoral support, reflected, according to the 
realignmentists, new patterns of party-voter alignments. The party system changes did not 
mean that the notion of cleavages as such was an invalid assumption. The realignment 
approach recognised that social structures through cleavages had the ability to structure the 
party competition, but the party system changes reflected alignments along other cleavages 
than the ones Lipset and Rokkan had suggested.  
 
The importance of Lipset and Rokkan’s traditional cleavages was by Dalton et al. (1984: 13) 
proved to be declining in Western Europe. Class and religion had decreased importance for 
voting behaviour, and their structuring capacity upon party competition had been replaced by 
other issues. The electorate’s support for new political parties also suggests that there were 
changes regarding the kinds of cleavages dividing the electorate (Dalton 1988: 173-174). The 
party system changes were viewed as a realignment around new cleavages such as a 
resurrection of the centre-periphery axis, post-materialism, immigrant scepticism and the EU-
issue (Heywood, Jones and Rhodes 2002: 119). Further, the interconnection between the 
established parties and their collateral organisations, such as labour unions and interest 
groups, representing an essential linkage in aligning parties to voters through cleavage 
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structures, was also changing in its nature4 (Luther and Müller-Rommel 2002). New social 
bases and new political issues brought about new alliances of partisan alignment.  
 
The emergence of Green parties showed that the party system no longer could be considered 
as frozen, obviously there was room for mobilising another political alternative than the 
established ones. Alber (1989: 197) observed that societal trends created the potentials for 
new cleavages represented by the Green parties. The “educational revolution” and the state 
penetration were seen as critical junctures that created structural changes restructuring the 
foundations of cleavages. New parties could emerge due to a structurally blocked mobility. 
Alber’s study of Green parties fitted the theoretical framework of Lipset and Rokkan. The 
survival of the new parties representing the new cleavages was decided by the organisational 
consolidation of the party. “…the parties may remain politically relevant even if 
constellations that made for they rise no longer prevails since parties become independent 
agents of mobilisation” (Alber 1989: 210).   
Dealignment – no cleavages 
The erosion of the Western European party system was regarded by the “dealignmentists” as a 
prove of the reduced structuring capacity of cleavages in general. Lipset and Rokkan might 
have been right when “Party Systems and Voter behaviour” came out in 1967, but the nature 
of party politics had changed since then. Their theoretical framework did not fit the new 
context, especially regarding the linkage between parties and voters. A decreasing share of the 
electorate voted along old patterns of party ties, and the social group identity could no longer 
predict the support for one particular party. The long-lasting alignments between parties and 
voters through cleavages did not unveil the predicted pattern. In addition to the less anchored 
partisanship, political parties faced a challenge from other more floating forms of collective 
behaviour. This showed that the volatility was more than just a temporary erosion in partisan 
loyalties (Dalton et al. 1984: 188). This lead to the conclusion of “…cleavages in general 
(having) less structural capacity to influence voter choice than hitherto” (Heywood et al. 
2002: 123).  
 
Simon Hug (2001) stated that new parties, such as the Green parties, were an expression of 
new demands and neglected issues, but without referring to the cleavage alignment as such. 
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 This point can be seen as an extension of Kirchheimer’s catch-all parties and Panebianco’s electoral 
professionalism.  
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The emergence was explained by pointing to the strategic interactions between established 
parties and potential newcomers. A new party “…can be a social movement, a citizen 
initiative, a political entrepreneur, or even a group of members of an existing political party” 
(Hug 2001: 40). It was the interactions between established parties and actors of the potential 
new party that explained their emergence.   
 
Voters did not necessary align with a certain party the very same day they were born, but 
rather in the moment they entered the polling station. The assumed duration of party-voter 
alignments, found in cleavages, did not predict electoral outcomes. The reduced or absent 
structuring capacity of cleavages in general (old and new) drew the attention towards other 
independent explanatory variables, such as institutional factors and agency,  to better 
understand the process of party system formation, change and stability (Evans and Whitefield 
1993: 527).   
1.2.3 Other considerations  
The assumptions of cleavages’ structuring capacity upon party competition, whether there 
were new ones, realignment, or whether they were absent, dealignment, were also affected by 
behavioural changes of the different components within the framework of Lipset and 
Rokkan’s cleavage model. Their model do not necessary function the same way today as it 
did fifty years ago simply because the components behave and act differently than what 
Lipset and Rokkan assumed in the 1960s. This does not mean that the cleavage model itself 
has to be abolished, but the theoretical framework has to be reconsidered or adjusted to fit into 
new contexts.       
External actors 
The Lipset and Rokkan approach highlighted the role of structures and elite alliances in the 
state and nation building process to explain the emergence of cleavages and parties in 
Western Europe. The different actors and their policy goals appeared within the boarders of 
an autonomous state. There were of course external actors as well, such as the Catholic 
Church, the Socialist International and the Russian revolution, but they played a marginal role 
in the Lipset and Rokkan cleavage model.    
 
Party system formation in recent democratised regions has to account more actively for the 
role of external actors. For instance, post-communist Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has 
been influenced by external actors promoting democracy and party formation which has 
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impacted party organisation quite obviously, at least more than Lipset and Rokkan accounted 
for in their model. NATO, USA, EU and party organisations from established democracies in 
Western Europe, operate as external actors affecting political outcome in CEE (Berglund, 
Ekman and Aarebrot 2004: 41). For instance, party organisations in the EU supply their party 
twins in CEE with material and financial resources they never would have had access to. This 
trans-national party cooperation can definitely affect the success and failure of some political 
parties in new democracies. 
Non-member strategies 
The mass mobilisation of the electorate through partisan membership and collateral 
organisations constituted an important instrument for the party elites of getting access to and 
aligning with the electorate in Lipset and Rokkan’s model. The importance of the electorate is 
of course central to any party operating within a democratic system, irrespective of time and 
space. But there are different sources and methods for parties of gaining access to, and being 
successful on, the political arena today. Parties certainly depend on facing and aligning with 
the electorate on election day as a source of democratic legitimacy, but it can be argued that 
parties’ incentives of establishing long-lasting alignments with the electorate today are not the 
same as Lipset and Rokkan assumed in their model.  
 
Instead of mobilising the electorate through membership campaigns, organisations and civil 
society participation, parties use other channels to reach and influence the voters’ party 
choice. Especially the role of media and its focus upon personalities, leader qualities and 
simple message have changed the nature from mobilising to campaigning for election. Party 
elites have to sell themselves, their message and their party as reliable and responsible to the 
electorate. Other actors of organised collective behaviour and other methods of reaching the 
electorate make parties less voter-oriented because electoral success can be obtained through 
other channels.  
Spatial validity  
How region specific is the Lipset and Rokkan cleavage model? The state and nation building 
process and the origin of cleavages from critical junctures are limited to the Western 
European region. But the understanding of party system formation as alignments between 
parties and voters through socio-structural cleavages is more important for whether the 
analytical tool can be applied outside the core of Western Europe.  
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Lipset and Rokkan never suggested that their model could apply for other regions; their model 
had the intention of being regional specific (Berntzen and Selle 1988: 249). This thesis aims 
to challenge the spatial validity of the Lipset and Rokkan model by studying party system 
formation along the urban-rural cleavage in post-communist Lithuania. Some of Lipset and 
Rokkan’s theoretical prerequisites obviously have to be changed or be replaced in such an 
attempt. The interesting element however, is whether the understanding of the party systems 
as voter-party alignments through cleavages is a valid approach also outside Lipset and 
Rokkan’s geographical area.   
1.3 Alternative explanations 
The sociological approach of Lipset and Rokkan, emphasising social structures, is mainly 
contested by two alternative explanations; institutional factors and the role of agency. 
Together, all these three approaches have isolated advantages and disadvantages when 
explaining formation, change and development of political parties and party systems. This 
thesis examines two alternatives to the Lipset and Rokkan cleavage model, suggesting that 
parties operate according 1) institutional factors, and 2) agency. 
 
Before we go into to the literature providing alternatives to Lipset and Rokkan’s cleavage 
model, it is important to highlight the distinction between party formation and party change. 
Party formation deals with the origin of political parties, their emergence. Party change can be 
described as the process of transformation of existing parties as an explicit point of reference, 
or as the degree of “…responsiveness of parties and party systems to factors that created 
them” (Ware 1996: 8).  
 
Contemporary literature is quite extensive on elaboration of models of party system change, 
such as the already mentioned scholars Kirchheimer, Panebianco and Katz and Mair (page 
12), but when it comes to theories and models dealing with party system formation, scholars 
have failed to develop a framework that can be applied outside Western Europe (Biezen 2005: 
149). Lipset and Rokkan’s cleavage model still constitutes an important contribution for 
understanding the mechanisms behind party formation, although its theoretical framework and 
validity in time and space are contested.  
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1.3.1 Institutional factors 
Institutional factors did not make much of a difference when dealing with the political 
outcome or the formation of party systems in the Lipset and Rokkan perspective (Ware 1996: 
189). Stating that “the crucial differences among the party systems emerged in the early 
phases of competitive politics before the final phase of mass mobilisation”, Lipset and 
Rokkan (1967: 35) assumed that all political alternatives were mobilised when the 
institutional changes were made. Institutions were therefore seen more as dependent variables 
resulting from the interplay of social forces. For instance differences in the electoral systems 
did not by itself explain the difference between each party system regarding the survival of, 
differences in the number or origin of the parties represented in the party system.   
 
But other scholars have pointed to the importance of institutional factors and how these can 
affect the size of parties and the conflict dimensions along which parties seek to exploit (Ware 
1996: 199). Therefore institutional factors have to be taken into account when studying the 
development of political parties. The set of rules and norms simply regulate interaction 
between individuals and structure social relations since the institutional framework is the 
arena of political competition. Institutional factors ”…matters and affects the capability of 
political parties to reach their electoral, office and policy goals” (Luther and Müller-Rommel 
2002: 269). The outcome of political competition is related to the rules of the game or more 
specific, how parties compete. The nature of the party competition, as a result of institutional 
factors, also shapes individual preferences.   
Party formation 
Panebianco (1988) related the formation of parties and their ability to survive to 
institutionalisation itself. All parties must, according to Panebianco, institutionalise to a 
certain extent in order to survive as organisations (Panebianco 1988: 54). The internal power 
relations were essential to understand parties in his perspective. The degree of 
institutionalisation, meaning parties’ ability to exist independently of their origin, was related 
to the circumstances forming the parties. Panebianco named this the Genetic model (ibid: 50) 
which suggested three different sources of party formation; 1) through territorial diffusion, 
penetration, or both, 2) whether the party leadership were externally or internally legitimated, 
and 3), degree of charismatic leadership in the party formation process.  
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Through the process of institutionalisation the party developed its own logic and goals. 
Institutional goals could not be attributed by its members’ rational goals. The point was that 
the sources of party formation also affected the degree of successful party institutionalisation. 
Party formation through high degree of territorial penetration, internally legitimated and non-
charismatic leadership tended to lead to strong party institutionalisation (Ware 1996: 99).  
Electoral systems 
The inner variation of different electoral systems has mechanisms that generate and affect the 
outcome of election and thereby the party system. The Duverger’s law is maybe the most 
referred example of this (Kuhnle 2003: 68), where it states that “simple-majority single-ballot 
system favours the emergence of two-party systems5” (Ware 1996: 191). Scholars disagree 
whether the Duverger’s law should be viewed as a causal mechanism regarding the origin of 
party systems, meaning that SMD leads to two-party systems, or whether it deals with the 
sustainability of two-party systems when elections are arranged according to SMD principles. 
Kuhnle (2003: 68) interpreted Duverger to clearly reject the assumption of a multi-causal 
approach. The outcome was, according to Kuhnle, that Duverger was mainly concerned with 
the electoral system’s independent effects upon the party structure through influencing the 
number of parties, size, alliances and representatives. The SMD electoral system had an inner 
logic that generated the emergence of two competing parties. Da Silva (2006) was more 
supportive of a milder interpretation of the Duverger law, accounting for a wider rage of 
variables as well. The point was that institutional mechanisms such as electoral affected 
political outcomes (Kuhnle 2003: 68, with references to Duverger 1969: 205). 
 
Ware (1996: 193) argued that thresholds can form political competition and further individual 
party preferences. In order to stabilise and restrict party competition, voters and elites are 
forced to concentrate on parties that are large enough to win seats (Bakke and Sitter 2005: 
251). The higher this threshold is, the more difficult it is for smaller parties to gain 
representation. A larger percentage share of the seats in parliament goes to the largest parties. 
Party competition is thereby decided by parties managing to get represented after facing the 
electorate, here the rules of the games, such as the thresholds, may influence the outcome. 
Some parties have to adapt their strategy according to their possibilities to cross the threshold 
when fronting the electorate. 
                                                 
5
 Scholars have opted for a distinction between Duverger’s Law (Single-member-district leads to two-party 
systems) and Duverger’s hypothesis (elections with proportional representation leads to a multiparty system) 
(Kuhnle 2003: 70).  
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Institutional factors and rational actors 
When stating that the institutional factors, such as the electoral system, affect party system 
formation, one of its preconditions is a rational choice understanding of the actors involved in 
the party competition. According to Moser (1999: 361) institutionalisation “means that 
political actors have clear and stable expectations about other actors”. Regarding the electoral 
system, one thereby has to know the inner logic and the possible outcome that it generates to 
fully understand and operate according to it. Both voters and candidates have to be rational 
and able to make strategic choices based upon stable expectations about the electoral system 
and its predicted outcomes.  
 
The question is not whether institutions matter, because they do, but when they matter. 
Incentives to make new rules for “more” democracy after universal suffrage became the norm 
in Western Europe, for example going from SMD to PR elections, did not result in the 
emergence of new political alternatives despite this institutional change. In some cases it 
shifted the electoral balance, but in most cases changes in the electoral system strengthened 
the existing party systems (Kuhnle 2003: 77). The role of strongly institutionalised political 
parties accounts for the ability to use and manipulate institutional arrangements to reach own 
party goals. The party can thereby be viewed as an intermediate variable defining the strength 
of the institutional framework (Kuhnle 2003: 76). 
1.3.2 Agency 
The agency approach state that parties and party elites act within, and form the party system. 
Parties themselves are central actors in the formation of party systems and initiate changes 
within the party organisation as a strategy to win elections (Randall 2003: 350). It is not the 
structures or the institutional factors that decide the outcome of political competition, but the 
party elite’s ability to make the right choices to achieve electoral success. One can argue that 
Lipset and Rokkan had a naive understanding of party elites and their motivation for 
establishing political parties. In their perspective, party elites served as representatives of the 
public without self-interests. Contrary, scholars supporting agency related approaches suggest 
that party elites have both the self-interests and the ability to influence the party system. 
Party formation 
Duverger (Ware 1996: 94) argued that party formation occurred along a horizontal and a 
vertical dimension where agency played a central role. The horizontal dimension 
distinguished between direct and indirect parties. Direct parties could be seen as unitary 
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organisations built up around direct party structures, while indirect parties emerged as a 
unification of confederations or other bodies. A party could therefore be more or less direct in 
its formation. For instance the emergence of the British Labour Party consisted of more 
indirect structures, such as trade unions, cooperative societies and so, than the French 
Socialist Party, which was established more on direct party structures. The vertical dimension 
was the units of the different parties, their “original crew” so to speak. Duverger identified 
four types of original crews forming the parties in Western Europe. The caucus party; 
established by political elites within the legislative body, the branch party; member-based 
party organisations, the cell party; concerned with the quality not number of their recruits, and 
the militia party; extensive party organisation with many tasks outside conventional electoral 
politics (ibid 1996: 95-96). The point was that within all these four types of parties, agency 
played an important role in explaining the formation and the structure of the party.     
Agency and cleavages 
Schattschneider (1975) combined agency with cleavages and concluded with a more active 
part to be played by the party elites in the formation of cleavages. He acknowledged that 
cleavages may constitute the raw material of political competition, but he questioned the 
independency of structures. In his view, party leaders could simply seek to exploit cleavages 
to provide access to government. This view challenged the theoretical framework of Lipset 
and Rokkan’s approach since Schattschneider more or less stated that cleavages were top-
down creations made to raise the party elite’s possibilities to get in office (Ware 1996: 197). 
 
Schattschneider’s argument was that the role of party leaders and the choices they made as 
entrepreneurs influenced the formation of party systems just as much as societal structures did 
(Ware 1996: 198). If there were numerous conflicts within the society, the party leaders had to 
find the most important one. This gave party leaders a straight route to office and power. 
Following this argument one might state that party leaders of the “New Politics Parties” 
defined new conflict dimensions, such as environmental protection vs. economical growth and 
party bureaucrats vs. “common people”, and thereby entered the party system. The 
development of cleavages was a prime instrument for party leaders to enter the political arena 
or even take over the government (Schattschneider 1975: 73)6.  
 
                                                 
6
 Schattschneider’s approach can be viewed as the opposite of Kirchheimer’s catch-all perspective where party 
leaders avoid or undermine the conflict potential of the cleavages within the society (Ware 1996: 231).  
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The structural conditions may be present, but the actual cleavage formation has to be defined 
and conducted by someone. This is where the role of agency is combined with the structural 
characteristics, just as Schattschneider argue. Still, if one assumes that agency is present in all 
party systems, why do party systems themselves differ? Party formation takes place under 
different circumstances and the role of agency can vary within this perspective. Ware (1996: 
200) argued that party elites’ ability to conduct entrepreneurship was related to three different 
ways the voter connected with a party. 1) The material/individual link; voters linked to the 
party through social hierarchy based upon material risk and benefits, example patronage. 2) 
The social solidarity link; voters express identity or solidarity with certain groups within 
society, example class voting. 3) The policy/personalistic/image link; party preference is 
motivated by what the party offers in terms of policies, image or personality of the leadership. 
All three constituted analytically distinct forms of voter-party relations. 
 
The party elites’ ability to manage entrepreneurship in changing dominant cleavages and 
social alliances had the most favourable conditions in the third point less in the second. 
Scholars, such as Heywood et al. (2000), Dalton et al (1984), Luther and Müller (2002), have 
argued that it is exactly the second point, the social solidarity link that is declining in Western 
Europe resulting in a thawing of the cleavage alignments. Voters do not cast ballots along 
socio-structured cleavages, which lead to more favourable conditions for an actor-centred 
approach to the party formation process (Evans and Whitefield 1993: 527).  
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Chapter 2  
The effects of communism 
 
Chapter 1 discussed Lipset and Rokkan’s cleavage model and presented alternatives to 
explain party system formation. The literature on party system formation in Western Europe 
can be viewed according to three variables; cleavages, institutional factors and agency. 
Chapter 2 elaborates the conditions for cleavages, institutional factors and agency in the party 
system formation process in a post-communist setting.   
2.1 Party formation in a post-communist context 
Scholars disagree whether the development of party systems in post-communist Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) is going towards more stability or if the party system still should be 
regarded as fluid. There are of course internal differences, one should therefore be careful to 
make broad generalisations. Especially Hungary and Czech Rep. are often highlighted as 
examples of emerging stable party systems in the region. Here, both the number of parties 
volatility level is lower than the rest of CEE (Bakke 2002: 237, Bakke and Sitter 2005: 243, 
Sitter 2002: 152, Bugajski 2002: 348, 221). The overall tendency, however, is that both 
deputies and voters in CEE are less loyal to parties than in Western Europe resulting in 
unstable party system.  
2.1.1 Party defection 
Volatility measures in CEE are way above Western European level, in some countries not at 
all decreasing over time (Sikk 2005:400). The party system instability is shown by the high 
level of party defection among elites, deputies move from one party to another or establish 
new ones, and by the high level of volatility among the voters. In addition to unstable 
electoral support for the established parties, new parties successfully emerge, but disappear, 
then change name, splinter and merge with other parties resulting in fluid party configurations 
(Millard 2004: 114). Although some parties seem to survive, their support, coalition partners 
and policy is quite unpredictable from election to election.  
 
Party defection among the electorate is usually measured by volatility, but this measure itself 
does not distinguish between the “…dynamics among incumbent parties and the rise of new 
ones” (Sikk 2005: 391). This is of course essential in a region like CEE where both shifting 
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support for established parties and the emergence of new ones have contributed to unstable 
party systems7. Sikk (2005:400) concluded with no apparent decrease in volatility level over 
time, but a “…modest overall decrease in the popularity of new parties”. Considered recent 
party developments in some of these countries after 2000, there are reasons to doubt his 
conclusion about the decreasing support for new parties.    
2.2 The communist heritage  
The effect of the communist regimes upon party system formation in CEE is a contested issue 
among scholars. Communism as a way of organising the society affected the region at every 
thinkable level, from individual to state. One can not refer to any comparable historical 
analogies that have been through a similar development as the region of CEE, first during, 
then after the fall of communism. Without doubt, one can say that history matters when 
studying CEE, the question is of course what history and how it matters (Millard 2004: 4). 
 
Chapter 1 elaborated three approaches to party system formation in Western Europe; 
cleavages, institutional factors and agency. Have the years under communism affected the 
theoretical preconditions for applying this framework to explain party system formation in a 
post-communist setting? Scholars studying this topic have arrived at a number of different 
variables, circumstances and answers. Evans and Whitefield (1993) structured the literature 
on how the communist regimes in CEE have affected the conditions for party system 
formation into three approaches. This separation was by no mean decisive, but it pointed to 
the scholars’ main attach of importance when assessing the topic and the implications of 
translating a western-based theoretical framework into the post-communist context. 
According to Evans and Whitefield studies on communism’s impact upon party system 
formation in CEE can be divided into 1) the Modernisation approach, where the impact of 
communism upon conditions for party system formation was assumed to be limited, 2) the 
Missing middle approach, postulated the opposite, communism did affect the preconditions 
for applying the Western European theoretical framework, and 3) the Comparative approach, 
being essentially a mixture of the former two, stating that communism had different impacts 
in different countries8.  
                                                 
7
  Sikk’s study (2005) includes ten CEE countries. The time frame is from 1990-2000.     
8
 The Comparative approach is not central for the topic of this thesis and will be left out of the further discussion.    
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2.2.1 Modernisation approach 
The impact of modernisation on interest aggregation was central in the “Modernisation 
approach” (Evans and Whitefield 1993: 531). It claimed that the modernisation of the region, 
in terms of industrialisation, urbanisation and bureaucratisation during communism, created 
the same occupational and status structures as this process did in Western Europe. The similar 
institutional framework would generate the same effects and thereby the same results in CEE 
as in Western Europe, regardless of communist political and economic institutions. This 
essentially meant that the Western European theoretical framework could be imposed on CEE 
without theoretical implications. The impact of communism was not seen as an essential 
obstacle for party formation along Western principles in the region. 
Cleavages 
Berglund, Ekman and Aarebrot (2004)9 can be said to support the Modernisation approach. 
Their ambition was to “describe the full set of cleavages at various critical junctures in the 
history of Central and Eastern Europe” (Berglund et al. 2004: 13). They were heavily 
influenced by Lipset and Rokkan’s cleavage model, stating that cleavages matter in 
structuration of voters’ and parties’ behaviour and in determining the number of parties and 
nature of partisan conflict (ibid: 8). Their cleavage definition was somewhat related to 
Bartolini and Mair’s three-level definition. “A cleavage is rooted in a persistent social 
division, which enables us to identify certain groups in society”, and “cleavages are 
institutionalised in the form of political parties and other associational groups” (ibid: 10). 
 
The mechanisms leading to party-voter alignments would be the same in CEE as Lipset and 
Rokkan postulated for Western Europe. Voters in CEE will have some social and ideological 
characteristics that parties graft, creating a party system and a cleavage structure similar to the 
ones found in Western Europe. Berglund et al. pointed to history when they argued which 
cleavages were present in CEE and ended up with three different categories of cleavages 
(ibid: 602). The first category was the five Lipset and Rokkan cleavages, which Berglund et 
al. referred to as “Historical cleavages”. Parties and party systems in post-communist CEE 
reflected the patterns found in the region during the democratic interlude of the Interwar 
period when the Historical cleavages structured the party competition (Berglund et al. 2004: 
35). The return to pre-communist party attachment and party conflicts was based upon Lipset 
                                                 
9
 The first edition of this book came out in 1998. The 2004 edition is an updated version, adding some countries 
to their analysis.    
28 
and Rokkan’s assumption of continuous party representation through long lasting party-voter 
alignments. The second category referred to so-called “Contemporary cleavages”, involving 
four cleavages emanating from the period after the transition. The last category consisted of 
the “Transitional cleavage”, referring to a cleavage from the actual transition phase. Berglund 
et al. thereby argued with the presence of ten different cleavages in the region, new and old, 
based on parties represented in the region’s national parliaments after 1989.  
 
When reading the conclusions in the first edition of their book, the 1998 version (Berglund, 
Hellén and Aarebrot 1998: 373), one can hardly see any structuration of the party system in 
CEE along the cleavage pattern they suggested. The multidimensional cleavage structure (up 
to nine cleavages) is more confusing than resolving. The same applies for their updated 2004 
edition, now with ten possible cleavages. First of all, if cleavages are institutionalised in the 
form of political parties, how should we link a cleavage to a party? For instance, Berglund et 
al (2004: 602) concluded with the presence of a religious-secular cleavage in Estonia based 
upon the representation of Christian democratic parties, reflecting the name. There were 
several parties labelling themselves “Christian Democrats” in the Estonian parliament in the 
early 1990s, but this is definitely not sufficient to conclude with the presence of a religious-
secular cleavage. One of these parties, the marginal Estonian Christian People's Party (EKR), 
was for instance one of very few EU-sceptical parties and a member of the Estonian anti-EU 
accession movement. This party might represent EU-scientism rather than a religious-secular 
cleavage. Secondly, the pattern of re-established “historical cleavages” has not been obvious 
since very few Interwar parties have survived communism, such as for instance the agrarian 
parties. The parties that emerged in the region after 1989 did not reflect the historical 
alignments with the electorate, and there are few similarities between today’s party structure 
and the one of the democratic interlude of the Interwar era. In addition, parties come and go in 
CEE, which make it difficult to talk about continuous party structure through party-voter 
alignments. 
  
It is of my opinion that the electoral volatility and constant emergence of newcomer parties in 
CEE, can not be explained by the cleavage concept and the theoretical framework as it was 
applied by Berglund et al. They failed because they copied the Lipset and Rokkan approach 
using political parties as cleavage indicators. But how do we know that certain parties 
represent certain cleavages, and how can we use cleavages to explain the unstable party 
system with constant emergence of new parties? Since their approach emphasised the 
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organisational expression to indicate the presence of cleavages, it basically implies that a new 
cleavage is added whenever a new party emerge. Berglund et al.’s conclusion of a 
multidimensional cleavage structure in CEE can therefore be said to reflect the unstable party 
system, not explain it.  
Institutional factors 
When studying newly democratised regions, such as for instance CEE, the same institutional 
framework can be argued to produce very different outcomes, at least from the ones known 
from Western Europe. Kitschelt argued that there might be a time lag for institutional factors, 
they will have more visible effects after than during the democratisation: “…political 
institutions, at least initially, have little impact on the formation of party alternatives and party 
strategies, although the obviously affect the electoral outcomes” (Kitschelt 1992: 9). 
 
Shugart (1998) found that the institutional framework, such as parliamentary or presidential 
systems, could inhibit or strengthen the formation of political parties in new democracies. The 
reason was that the different institutional framework operated with different executive 
powers. The legislators campaigned on the basis of their parties’ reputation if executive 
authority was constitutionally weak, and visa versa (Shugart 1998: 1). The interests of 
politicians in forming parties to achieve political power could be deduced from the framework 
they operate within.  
 
Another institutional factor is the electoral system. According to Duverger’s law, in a country 
with majority election in single-member-district (SMD) one should expect an emerging two-
party system (see page 21). Moser (1999) examined the electoral systems and their effects 
upon the number of parties in post-communist CEE. Most electoral systems in CEE are 
mixed; representatives are elected both through party lists PR systems and single mandate 
majority election (Moser 1999: 365). Combining the Duverger law and the Duverger 
hypothesis, Moser suggested that PR-election should lead to the formation of many parties 
and SMD-election to two-party systems. His findings did not support this assumption10. 
Moser concluded that the varying levels of institutionalised party systems in CEE explained 
the lack of strategic voting in the region (Moser 1999: 383).  
 
                                                 
10
 Kuhnle (2003: 76) supported Moser’s findings, the electoral system, at least not in the Duverger way, can not 
explain the number of political parties in the region.  
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Parties serve as the primary mechanism to channel and aggregate public opinion while electoral 
systems are a secondary mechanism influencing the number of viable political parties. If 
significant political parties do not exist, they cannot aggregate political elites into nationwide 
political organisations, nor represent large segments of the public opinion (Moser 1999: 364). 
 
A stable party system can therefore be seen as an intermediate variable to explain the effects 
of the electoral system upon the number of political parties in CEE. The weakly 
institutionalised party systems constrained institutions of playing a decisive role in forming 
the party system. The weak parties reduced the ability for both voters and elites to make 
strategic choices based upon clear and stable expectations about political actors.  
Agency 
According to the Modernisation approach the party formation should take place under the 
same circumstances as the formation of the Western European party system. Kitschelt found it 
“…plausible to question whether post-communist party systems organize around lasting lines 
of conflict that are based on rival political programmes and value commitments” (1995: 448). 
Therefore, the politics of personality and charisma became more important in structuring 
political attitudes than the ideological content of traditional party competition in CEE (Evans 
and Whitefield 1993: 539).  
 
Structural conditions may constrain or encourage the actors’ behaviour. As pointed out in 
Chapter 1 (page 23), party formation took place under different circumstances and the role of 
agency can vary within this perspective. One such condition is the historical baggage of each 
party, which limits and defines their action space. Most CEE parties are young without 
longstanding historical roots to organisations, ideology or voters. Constraining elements can 
therefore be argued to be less important. The party itself, with its leadership, can affect the 
party system formation process more independently. The structural conditions might be 
favourable for an actor-centred approach to the party formation process agency in CEE.   
2.2.2 Missing middle approach 
The importance of civil society organisation as a source of interest and political allegiance is 
often described as decisive to coordinate stable interaction between voters and political parties 
(Whitefield 2002: 183, with references to Sartori 1969 and Przeworski 1985). But, according 
  31   
to the Missing middle approach11 forty years of communist monopoly of all kinds of political 
activity had a “…debilitating effect on civil society, (undercutting) the possibility of a return 
to pre-war party attachment or party conflicts” (Evans and Whitefield 1993: 534). Civil 
society interests were therefore more or less absent when political competition became the 
norm in the region (Lewis 2002: 33).  
 
The political parties that emerged in CEE after 1989 could not grow out of long-lasting 
mobilised mass interests because “…communism deprived individuals from institutional or 
societal structured identities from which to derive political interests” (Evans and Whitefield 
1993: 522). Due to the communist control with civil society, the atomisation of the society 
inhibited the formation of stable alignment between voters and parties because intermediate, 
middle range civil society organisations did not exist when the party competition started. 
Structuring of group interests and political preferences began after the transition (Johannsen 
2003: 296) and post-communist party formation therefore lacked institutional and social 
structured identities, such as for instance ideology. The result was individual rather than 
collective actions shown in the volatile voter behaviour. The Missing middle presented a 
critique of the Modernisation approach mentioned above since it assumed that absence of a 
common organised social identity, undermined the mobilisation of political interests into 
stable alliances, not to mention the re-emergence of the Interwar alignments. The result was a 
highly volatile electorate and unstable party system without corresponding conflict pattern of 
the one found in Western Europe.  
Cleavages   
The cleavages were not and could not be mobilised to the same degree in CEE, according to 
the Missing middle approach. The lack of a common social base for collective identity failed 
to produce common characteristics necessary to form cleavage alignments, and further stable 
party systems. Without this stabilising element, party systems became susceptible to 
personalism and populism (Tavits 2005: 287). When communism broke down voters and 
parties emerged at the same time, while the cleavages, assuming to align specific voters to 
specific parties, were introduced later. Rose and Shin (2001) named this process 
“democratisation backward”; free elections were introduced before establishing basic 
institutions as the rule of law and civil society to channel interest aggregation (Rose and Shin 
                                                 
11
 The Missing middle corresponds with what other scholars have called the Tabula Rasa theory (Kitschelt 1992 
and Johannsen 2003). 
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2001: 333). The party-voter alignment through cleavages occurred after the parties established 
themselves on the political arena. According to Lewis (2000), voters therefore choose from a 
long list of political parties that came into existence at the same time as democracy was 
installed.  
 
Voters choose from a selection of parties that have come into existence for a whole range of 
reasons and subsequently decide to present themselves to the electorate on different grounds. 
Cleavages that might be significant within the society as a whole may or may not effect voting 
patterns, which, in turn, do not necessarily themselves determine the range of institutional choice 
available or thus shape the party system itself (Lewis 2000: 143). 
 
Tavits (2005) found no evidence supporting that presence of cleavages had a stabilising effect 
upon the party system in CEE. With special attention to the ethnic and the urban-rural 
cleavage, she concluded that these cleavages only affected electoral stability during economic 
downturns. The nature of the party system therefore became fluid since the cleavages lacked 
the ability to structure party competition. The aligning of parties and voters through cleavages 
had to be conducted in a political environment without any prior sources of institutional and 
social structured identities.  
Institutional factors 
If parties emerge and operate according to the rules of the games, the party system of CEE 
can be explained by features of the institutional framework. But the design of the electoral 
system has not had the expected stabilising effects upon the political landscape in this region. 
The party system formation has not become structured along the expectations of the Duverger 
Law (Moser 1999: 364, Kuhnle 2003: 76). Regarding thresholds, Millard (2004: 140) argued 
that they to some extent promote the consolidation of the parties’ size, but the number of party 
contenders was not affected by the threshold. New entrants, due to splits and newly 
established parties, kept on entering the competition with successful results.  
 
Panebianco (1988) suggested that the circumstances surrounding the formation of parties 
affected their ability to institutionalise and thereby survive. The Missing middle, saying that 
communism deprived the region from a common organised social identity undermining the 
mobilisation of political interests into stable alliances, limits party formation to be initiated by 
charismatic leadership. Panebianco stated that parties formed by charismatic leaders had 
unfavourable conditions when institutionalising (Ware 1996: 99).   
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As mentioned in Chapter 1 (page 22) the role of strongly institutionalised political parties 
represent an intermediate variable, defining the strength of the institutional framework 
(Kuhnle 2003: 76, Moser 1999: 361). Political actors need to have clear and stable 
expectations about other to act according to the rules of the games. The lack of well 
established parties undermined the ability of voters and parties to behave according to 
expectations, and further to make strategic choices. Although institutional factors can be said 
to shape party strategies, one can argue that the game itself is not yet fully understood by the 
different actors involved (Kitschelt 1992: 9). For instance Bakke and Sitter (2005: 252) 
suggested that “…institutional change (in Poland) was as much the consequence of party 
system instability as the cause”. Especially in the early phases of democratic transition, 
political institutions reflect the division in power between political parties, which in turn 
reflect the division within the society (Ware 1996: 200, Bakke and Sitter 2005: 250). 
Agency 
Scholars claim that elite factors and agency account strongly for the pattern of party system 
formation in weakly developed civil societies. Here political leaders can shape the issue 
agenda under different degrees of constraints, these constraints being for instance structural 
conditions, civil society organisation and parties’ own history (Chhibber and Torcal 1997). 
Lipset and Rokkan assumed that parties had their own unique history, a historical baggage 
limiting the parties’ ability to act independently. But as already underlined by the Missing 
middle, parties seemed to be less constrained by history in CEE. One might suggest a rewrite 
of the Lipset and Rokkan statement from Chapter 1 (page 10): Parties do simply present 
themselves de novo to the citizen at each election This gives the party elites better 
opportunities to influence the cleavage formation process, just as Schattschneider argued 
(Ware 1996: 202). When party systems are weak, the absence of party identification has to be 
replaced by personal characteristics of the political leadership as the most important criteria 
for how voters cast they ballot12. Voters channel demands by relaying upon political 
entrepreneurs.  
Following the lack of constraining structural conditions and civil society organisations, giving 
party leaders greater ability to shape the agenda, Biezen (2005: 155) illustrated two different 
mobilisation strategies for party elites, partisan and electoral mobilisation. Parties in new 
                                                 
12
 This point also corresponds with the new forms of political behaviour addressed in Chapter 1 (page 18). 
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democracies lacked natural constituencies and a defined electorate when democratic norms 
became the practice. The competition for voters in general, and not partisans, became the 
most important source of electoral success since partisan mobilisation is both time consuming 
and resource demanding. Parties therefore preferred electoral mobilisation13. Biezen (2005: 
168) argued that this organisational style was more forcefully present in CEE than in Western 
Europe. As a result the parties in CEE tend to have small participatory membership 
organisations and are weakly linked to civil society organisations.  
In CEE the parties are professional electoral vehicles with a direct link to the electorate 
without indirect linkages, such as local party organisation branches and trade unions. Party 
branches of local organisations rarely exceed ¼ of the country, and especially local elections 
are dominated by independent candidates and a low profile of parties (Biezen 2005: 159). The 
absence of existing voter-party links made it easier for new parties to emerge (Ware 1996: 
150). The low territorial and societal penetration of party organisations: 
 
…leaves parties by and large remote from large sectors of society, and, consequently renders 
partisan linkage more generally of little relevance as a channel to structure the relationship 
between parties and society (Biezen 2005: 159).  
 
The degree of territorial and societal penetration was relevant for what Lipset and Rokkan 
saw as central for the parties’ ability to align with the electorate to create a stable environment 
for party competition. One might argue that the role of political entrepreneurs became 
increasingly important in the party formation process since there in general was a lack of civil 
society organisation in CEE.  
 
But this does not necessary mean the “…end of structuration of politics by social divisions” 
(Kriesi 1998: 181). There is an interrelationship between political actors’ ability to identify 
and address common ideological denominator with interest and values found among the 
electorate (Enyedi 2005). As Enyedi argues, the Lipset and Rokkan conceptualisation and use 
of the cleavage allows for a more active role of political agents or entrepreneurs in the process 
of cleavage formation:  
 
                                                 
13
 Somewhat similar with Kirchheimer’s (1966) catch-all parties, focusing upon electoral mobilisation. 
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 While in Lipset and Rokkan’s framework political oppositions are underpinned by well-defined 
socio-structural characteristics, the actual development of cleavages is shown to be centered on 
actors and norms (Enyedi 2005: 698).          
 
This view is also found in Lipset and Rokkan’s theoretical framework. Parties are given a 
central explanatory role in generating political conflicts. 
 
…parties themselves might establish themselves as significant poles of attraction and produce their 
own alignments independently of the geographical, the social and the cultural underpinnings of the 
movements (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 3).  
 
The Missing middle approach suggested that the theoretical preconditions concerning party 
formation explained by cleavages, institutional factors and agency had to be modified when 
applying this framework on CEE. First of all, the weakened civil society organisations 
hindered party formation along cleavage structure. Secondly, the role of institutional factors 
as independent variable was reduced, and thirdly, as a result of the others, agency played a 
vital role in the party system formation in CEE.   
2.3 Are there post-communist cleavages? 
The literature on party system formation in CEE, divided into the Modernisation approach 
and the Missing Middle approach, provide two different answers when assessing the question 
of cleavages in a post-communist setting. This can be explained by their different views 
regarding the effects of communism upon civil society organisation. This has further 
consequences for the applicability of the western-based theoretical framework of party system 
formation. Scholars have presented results partly supporting both views, but we can generate 
two contradicting statements regarding cleavage presence in CEE: 
   
1) Cleavages do not exist in CEE (Missing middle) 
2) Cleavages exist in CEE (Modernisation) 
No cleavages 
Cleavages constitute the raw material of party competition. The problem however is that this 
approach rarely fit other cases than Western European party systems (Biezen 2005: 149). The 
structural capacity of cleavages are doubted when cleavages are not reflected in stable party 
systems. But if cleavages do not exist in CEE, how is party competition structured then? 
Structuration of party competition along cleavages has been criticised because the duration 
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and predictability of these cleavage alignments have been contested, especially when party 
configurations are fluid. When leaving the cleavages behind, explanations of party system 
formation emphasise either institutional factors or agency. Although institutional factors 
arguably affect party system formation, the theoretical framework for these effects 
prerequisite rational actors. Rational actors mean stable conditions and predictability for 
political competition (Moser 1999, Andresen 200514). The effects of communism in CEE 
theoretically imply that institutional factors in general are less important than agency. The 
preconditions for institutions to independently affect the party formation are not fully present 
because the actors (parties) themselves are unstable. Agency, on the other hand, can be 
viewed as more relevant in this matter.  
Cleavages, but which ones? 
If we assume that voters derive party preferences from cleavages also in post-communist 
CEE, as the Modernisation approach suggests, the next task is to locate which cleavages are 
present in the region. First of all, scholars agree on the existence of attitudinal divides among 
the electorate, but the literature is more inconclusive regarding these divides’ structuring 
capacity in institutionalising the party system (Johannsen 2003: 294). Secondly, the CEE 
shared a history of communism, but it is unlikely to find a uniform cleavage structure across 
the entire region15. Fertile conditions for one cleavage might be found in one country, but not 
in another. Different socio-economic structures influence the presence and importance of 
cleavages, and how they interact with other cleavages (Johannsen 2003: 293).  
 
So far, these cleavages or attitudinal divides have been identified to be of pivotal importance 
for the structuring of the party system in CEE after 1989: 
- As already mentioned, Berglund et al. (1998 and 2004) suggested three subgroups of 
cleavages; historical (see page 8), contemporary and transitory. They ended up with 
ten different cleavages in the region, applying a framework very similar to the Lipset 
and Rokkan.   
- Kostelecky (2002) added two cleavages, a generational and a gender-based, to the 
Lipset and Rokkan cleavages.  
                                                 
14
 Andresen’s article points to the importance of contextual understanding of the mechanisms behind rational 
choices on money savings in Russia.   
15
 This is essentially the point of the Comparative approach in Evans and Whitefield (1993). 
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- Kitschelt (1992), without referring to cleavages as such, suggested that the party 
competition was structured along an issue dimension reflecting pro-market liberals vs. 
pro-state authoritarians. 
- Evans and Whitefield (1998) studied left-right self-placement when predicting support 
for pro market parties. 
- Zarycki (Johannsen 2003 with reference to Zarycki 2000) found that left-right 
economic issues corresponded with an urban-rural cleavage.    
- Bakke (2002: 239) suggest four cleavages in addition to the Lipset and Rokkan ones: 
the view of democracy, judging of the past, pro/anti market economy and foreign 
policy.  
2.3.1 Why cleavages are problematic in a post-communist setting 
As seen from the discussion above, scholars do not agree on a uniform cleavage structure in 
CEE. The constant shift of the party configurations constitutes a problem when identifying 
cleavage presence in the region. The high level of voter volatility reflects the weak links 
between parties and socio-structured interests among the electorate and volatility itself 
therefore becomes an argument against cleavage presence in CEE.  
 
Identifying cleavages 
The cleavage concept was discussed in Chapter 1, where the organisational expression of the 
cleavage, namely political parties, was most often used by scholars to indicate its presence. 
This theoretically leads to three possible assumptions concerning the presence of cleavages in 
CEE: First of all, many shifting parties would indicate a multi-dimensional cleavage structure 
in CEE. For instance Berglund et al. (2004: 602) listed up a pattern consisting of ten different 
cleavages. The second assumption when using parties as cleavage indicators, is that these 
cleavages are fragmented and fluid since parties appear and disappear rapidly (Moser 1999: 
371). Thirdly, the lack of observable stability in party representation could lead us to conclude 
with the absent of cleavages in this region (Whitefield 2002: 184 with references to Ost 1993, 
White, Rose and McAllister 1997, Elster, Offe and Preusse 1998).  
 
One could end up arguing that new cleavages arise whenever new parties emerge and win 
seats in elections. This certainly becomes a challenge when new parties constantly emerge at 
every new election. Do these new parties then represent new, distinct cleavages? If so, the 
permanent element of a cleavage defined as “...persistent lines of salient social and 
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ideological division…” (Whitefield 2002: 181), the three-level presence of structure, attitudes 
and organisations (Bartolini and Mair 1990) and the party-voter alignment approach of Lipset 
and Rokkan (1967), lack the ability to explain the structuration of party competition in CEE.  
 
All these assumptions are derived on the basis of stable parties indicating the presence of 
cleavages. This constitutes a problem when parties come and go, new ones enter the scene, 
and are rarely built upon representation of specific societal interests. The behaviour of parties 
in CEE makes them simple not suited for indicating cleavages. Voters may still derive their 
party preferences from cleavages, but the organisational expression (parties) and the stable 
party-voter alignments do not have favourable condition for long lasting survival in CEE. The 
conclusion of many, unstable or none existing cleavages basically drawn from unstable party 
representation, could be seen as a methodological erroneous inference.  
 
Time horizon and alignment 
The challenge relates to how one approaches time horizon and alignment when identifying 
cleavages in a region where party representation is shifting. Organisation of societal division 
into mobilised political alternatives in post-communist CEE was faced with two challenging 
factors. First of all, the communist heritage and its weakening of common social identity 
(Missing middle), and secondly, many events occurred at the same point in time, so-called 
“phase accumulation” (Rokkan 1970). The time horizon for voters to align to certain parties 
through cleavages in CEE was dramatically shortened compared to the Lipset and Rokkan 
framework16. Since democracy and party competition occurred at same point in time, the 
party-voter alignments had to be conducted without having prior civil society organisation to 
build upon and within a very short time horizon. The short time horizon is related both to the 
political development through phase accumulation, many processes taking place at the same 
time, and the limited duration of party-voter alignments.  
 
 
                                                 
16
 Here the alignment happened within a time scope of almost 500 years, from the Reformation till the 
introduction of universal suffrage in the beginning of the 1920s. 
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Chapter 3  
The Reversed cleavage model 
 
Chapter 3 introduces the Reversed cleavage model, which is an attempt to explain the 
unstable party system formation in post-communist Lithuania. Incorporating elements from 
the Modernisation approach and the Missing middle, the Reversed cleavage model is built 
upon the Lipset and Rokkan framework. Since parties represent a changing element in CEE, 
the Reversed cleavage model assumes that cleavages represent the continuing variable while 
parties vary. This framework might be favourable to approach the lack of party system 
formation in Lithuania to understand party-voter relations in a post-communist setting17.  
3.1 Building a model for post-communist Lithuania 
The motivation for using Lipset and Rokkan’s framework is to apply a structural approach to 
the party system formation in Lithuania. The division in voter’s party preferences, found in 
socio-structured cleavages, should thereby correspond with division found among party 
alternatives. But instead of studying party system stability, as Lipset and Rokkan did, this 
thesis focuses upon why stable party systems so far have not emerged in Lithuania. The 
empirical preconditions imply that the cleavage model has to undergo some adjustments to fit 
into the new context. The major problem when applying the Lipset and Rokkan cleavage 
model on Lithuania is that the organisational expression of the cleavage, namely political 
parties, represents an unstable variable.  
3.2 The Reversed cleavage model 
By using Lipset and Rokkan’s assumption of party-voter alignments through cleavages, but 
applying a reversed logic, the focus is drawn towards continuity at conflict level instead of the 
party level. By incorporating elements from the Modernisation approach and the Missing 
middle approach, the theoretical framework of the Reversed cleavage model acknowledges 
both the presence of cleavages and the role of agency in the party system formation. Although 
parties may come and go, cleavages do not necessary have to do the same. The Reversed 
                                                 
17
 This framework can further be developed to create an eastern-centric approach to explain the lack of stable 
party system formation in CEE.    
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cleavage model builds upon the assumptions of parties being shifting and cleavages being 
constant. 
3.2.1 Parties are shifting 
Derived from the Missing middle, the first assumption of the Reversed cleavage model is that 
parties are weakly aligned with the electorate and weakly institutionalised. Being mainly 
driven by electoral mobilisation not partisan, meaning that they intend to catch as many voters 
as possible18, the parties never have the intention or capacity of establishing stable, long 
lasting alignments with subgroups within the electorate (Biezen 2005). This affects their 
ability to survive. It is the exact opposite postulation of Lipset and Rokkan’s expectations 
about parties’ ability to survive in Western Europe. It was the strong party-voter alignments 
that enabled parties to survive. The organisational strength and the historical baggage made 
parties capable of owing and interpreting new issues within the framework of existing 
cleavages. This limited the incentive for the emergence of new parties.  
 
Parties are shifting because they in the post-communist setting are fragile, elite controlled and 
incapable of implementing efficient policies anchored in the electorates’ interests. The top 
down construction of the parties weakens the elites’ commitment to the notion of party 
politics (Lewis 2000: 73) and party leaders as such, have few ideological liabilities since their 
party is not built upon representation of specific societal interests. They therefore lack the 
ability to own political issues and to freeze alignments with the electorate. This makes parties 
incapable of taking advantages of the institutional factors, such as for instance the electoral 
system. Their ability to solve societal conflicts, own, redefine and generate new conflicts into 
their party substance, and thereby survive, is dramatically reduced within this context.  
Parties as agents  
A fluid party structure affects the identification of cleavages because scholars emphasise 
stable party-voter alignments, thereby stable party systems, when indicating cleavages. When 
parties are weak, lack history and commitment to ideological liabilities, the preconditions for 
the Downsian argument about party competition along a spatial dimension is weakened 
(Downs 1957). If there exist a general commitment to history and ideologies, where parties 
recognise each other’s spatial boundaries, then;  
  
                                                 
18
 Somewhat similar to Kirchheimer’s catch all parties, see page 12. 
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…parties cannot move much beyond the centre, nor change their relative positions to left or right, 
because of the confusing effects this would have on electors and the lack of credibility of a party 
which repudiated its past commitments, not to mention the policy belief of leaders themselves 
(Budge 1994: 451).  
 
But according to the assumption of the Reversed cleavage model parties can move along and 
perhaps also leapfrog the different dimensions, just because their past commitments both to 
politics and electorate are weak. They do not have a historical baggage to develop bounded 
rationality (page 10). This opens the space for party entrepreneurs in forming the party 
system. The structural conditions may be present, but the actual cleavage formation has to be 
conducted by someone. The role of agency is here combined with the structural 
characteristics. Party entrepreneurs find the raw material for political competition in the 
cleavages, but weak party-voter alignments affect their ability to survive. These circumstances 
favour the emergence of parties, but weaken their ability to survive.   
Party types 
Scholars have tried to classify the parties in CEE into families according to policy, history or 
ideology but without being really successful (Berglund et al. 1998 and 2004, Bugajski 2002). 
The fluctuant representation of parties made the classification scheme more or less useless 
since it needed to be continuously updated. Many of the parties these scholars studied in the 
early 1990s were simply gone within the next election.  
 
The Reversed cleavage model approaches this problem by structuring parties along the 
cleavage, not families of an ideology or according to history. The parties are divided into 
types of parties belonging to either pro or contra the cleavage division. The societal conflicts 
can thereby be present in the party system by constant party type representation, but the 
parties themselves can vary. The party type division makes it possible to study the underlying 
societal conflict pattern over time, without referring to continuous party representation.    
3.2.2 Cleavages are constant 
Corresponding with the Modernisation approach, the Reversed cleavage model acknowledges 
the presence of cleavages as a source of party competition. Following the abovementioned 
assumption of shifting parties weakly aligned with the electorate unable to solve political 
issues they claim to represent, a second assumption is that cleavages are constant. The 
assumption of cleavages being continuous can further be derived from two sources; the 
communist heritage, and the behaviour of parties and voters. The societal changes during 
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communism could not be translated into political interest aggregation due to the authoritarian 
regime structure. Organisation of political interests had to be conducted after the fall of 
communism, along with many other processes. This phase accumulation weakens parties’ 
ability to solve or define societal conflicts (Rokkan 1970). Organisation of interests into 
political alternatives lags behind the societal changes. The behaviour of parties and voters also 
affect the cleavages. When voters align with the parties on election day, expectations about 
political performance of this party is generated. But due to weak institutionalisation, historical 
commitments and lack of organisational links between voters and parties, the parties are not 
sufficiently capable of implementing policy to solve the societal conflicts they claim to 
represent. The expectations of the electorate do not correspond with the actual results parties 
are capable of presenting. Because of the weak party-voter alignments, the conditions for new 
parties to emerge are favourable because voters change parties when these do not fulfil their 
expectations.   
 
The fact that voters change parties frequently does not necessary mean that the foundation for 
cleavages is absent. If the parties represent the organisational expression of the cleavage, 
voters may change this organisational expression due to a number of reasons, but still derive 
their party preference from cleavages. Maybe also the same cleavage from election to 
election. 
 
…rather than a change in political preferences, volatile behaviour reflects the change in 
institutional configuration among the contestant, that is, the mergers and splits and the public 
image of political parties (Johannsen 2003: 295).  
 
Volatile voter behaviour is not necessary the result of cleavages’ inability to structure voters’ 
party preferences, but a reflection of the fluid party configurations. If the same group of voters 
collectively goes from one party to another from one election to the next, one can argue that 
the cleavage persists and the voters just change the party representing the cleavage. Party 
entrepreneurs define themselves into the cleavage division without being forehand aligned, or 
having the intention of aligning, with the electorate. Figure 1 illustrates the assumed linkage 
between voter, cleavage and party. Both parties and voters are linked to the cleavage, but the 
dotted line between voter and party illustrate the weak party-voter alignment.  
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  Figure 1: Voter-cleavage-party linkage in the Reversed cleavage model 
 
Cleavage definition  
When defining the cleavage concept, the Reversed cleavage model focuses less upon stable 
party representation: A cleavage is understood as a structural approach to the link between 
societal conflicts and political preferences, aligning specific voters to specific political 
parties. By prerequisite cleavage continuity, the alternation of voters’ party preferences does 
not necessary mean realignment (other cleavages) or dealignment (no cleavages). The 
cleavage can mobilise the same voters but to different parties over time.  
 
By unveiling and identifying the societal conflict pattern, a cleavage is by all means related to 
the understanding of each voter’s preferences on micro level. The structures, and further the 
cleavages, are meant to be at hand with the interests, alternatives and choices the voter relates 
to. Neither voters nor parties are passive actors in the cleavage formation; both play a vital 
role in shaping and creating the alignment between party politics and voter preferences. The 
cleavage can therefore be seen as both constraining and catalysing political activity. Due to 
the assumption of cleavage continuity the parties either create or define themselves into 
cleavages without being beforehand aligned with the voter. This makes parties to a larger 
degree entrepreneurs of, not bearers of, political conflicts. The cleavage can persist detached 
from its fluctuant organisational expression, resulting in party systems with shifting party 
representation and constant cleavage presence.  
Figure  
In the Lipset and Rokkan cleavage model, parties survived by capturing the cleavage and 
aligning with the voters. New societal conflicts were defined into the parties’ substance. The 
parties in the Reversed cleavage model are not capable of institutionalising issue ownership 
and establish stable alignments to the electorate; they just position themselves pro or contra 
along the cleavage. The Reversed cleavage model is presented in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Shifting parties, constant cleavage 
 
 
As illustrated in Figure 2, party B, C and E are the same party type, representing the contra 
side of the cleavage. The point is that they are not the same party since they differ in name, 
profile and ideology. In election 1 party A and party B present themselves as pro and contra 
representatives of the cleavage, but weak party-voter alignments affect the parties’ ability to 
survive as cleavage representatives. In election 2, party B has leapfrogged and merged with 
party A, opening the space for a new contender, party C, on the contra side of the cleavage. In 
election 3, all parties representing the cleavage are replaced by new parties, party D and E. 
The cleavage is preserved by continuous party type representation, but with different parties.     
Latent and manifest cleavages 
Both Lipset and Rokkan’s cleavage model and the Reversed cleavage model do not 
exclusively emphasise the institutional factors when examining the formation of party 
systems and the survival of political parties. This does not mean that the institutional factors 
can be ignored as an element in this process. To make the model more parsimonious the 
institutional factors are left out as an independent component within the framework of the 
Reversed cleavage model. Instead the concepts “latent” and “manifest” cleavages can 
illustrate the institutionalisation of societal conflicts into organised political alternatives.  
 
A latent political cleavage can be viewed as a sociological term, being theoretically founded 
arguments of societal conflicts often based upon some kind of social division found in the 
society. Manifest cleavage, on the other hand, is more a term from political science, 
describing a conflict being translated into organised political action. The Lipset and Rokkan 
cleavage model for Western Europe operated with manifest cleavages, in this parties, as the 
constant element of their theoretical framework. The organisational expression of the 
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cleavage was manifested in continuous representation of political parties, while the latent 
societal conflicts were either ignored or randomly defined into the substance of the political 
parties. Expressed simplistic, the manifest cleavages (parties) were constant, while the latent 
cleavages (societal conflicts) were shifting.  
 
The assumption of the Reversed cleavage model is that the organisational expression of the 
cleavage can alter, but the latent conflict potential remains manifested in continuous party 
type representing. The latent element is the founding potential for the two opposing party 
types generated by the cleavage. Incentives for foundation of new political parties are always 
present, but this manifest element is characterised by instability.    
3.3 Analytical advantages  
By assuming that parties are shifting and that cleavages are constant, the Reversed cleavage 
model presents three solutions when approaching the party system formation in a post-
communist setting. First of all, it avoids that party system formation related to cleavages 
becomes too closely depended upon stable representation of particular parties. As shown 
above, when parties are fluid they do not necessary function optimal to indicate cleavage 
presence. Secondly, the role of agency and political entrepreneurs is given a broader 
explanatory position in the party formation process, along with the cleavages. The cleavage is 
thereby understood more abstract since it is not identified by institutionalised party 
representation, but by varying parties. According to the Missing middle approach, the role of 
agency is of pivotal importance in the party formation process in CEE. Cleavages constitute 
the raw material of party competition, but party leaders seek to exploit cleavages in the party 
formation process. And thirdly, the problem with short time horizons regarding the 
alignments between voters and parties are avoided since the continuous, institutional 
expression of the cleavage, namely the parties, is not seen as a precondition for the presence 
of cleavages. Alignments between parties and voters occur within a very short time horizon in 
the Reversed cleavage model.  
 
To sum up: Lipset and Rokkan assumed that cleavages resulted in certain parties, which 
survived by aligning with electorate and redefining new conflicts into their party substance. 
The result was stable party systems. The Reversed cleavage model assumes that cleavages are 
the raw material of party competition, but because of weak party-voter alignments and the 
parties’ inability to own and redefine societal conflicts into their party substance, the cleavage 
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does not lead to stable party support. Cleavages have the ability to structure party 
competition, but the electorate reflect the cleavage structure in their preference for different 
parties from election to election.  
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Chapter 4  
The urban-rural cleavage in Lithuania 
 
Can the urban-rural cleavage be found in Lithuania according to the theoretical assumptions 
in the Reversed cleavage model from Chapter 3? This would involve support for different 
parties along the same cleavage. Chapter 4 introduces the party system formation and the 
conditions for the presence of an urban-rural cleavage in Lithuania.  
4.1 Party system formation in Lithuania 
The 141 members of the Lithuanian parliament, Seimas, are elected according to a mixed 
electoral system. 71 representatives are elected in equally sized Single-Member-District 
(SMD). The remaining 70 representatives are elected in Proportional Representation (PR) on 
national party lists with the entire country as one constituency and a five percent lower 
threshold. This electoral system makes it possible for independent candidates and parties with 
regionally concentrated support to get elected in the SMD-election, while only the larger 
parties with broad national support will be elected in the PR-election. 
4.1.1 Political parties 
The presentation of the Lithuanian party system is structured along a left-right cleavage. 
There are mainly two reasons for using this cleavage and not for instance an urban-rural 
cleavage, which is the topic of this thesis. First of all, the political content of the left-right 
cleavage is relatively clear, both among parties and voters (Ware 1996: 20). Whether the issue 
is free market economy vs. social welfare or private vs. public schools, the perception of a 
left-right divide can be traced back to most actors within the political systems. Still, some 
parties, such as for instance agrarian parties, are more difficult than others to place in the left-
right diagram. Secondly, since the left-right cleavage is present in most party systems, also in 
Lithuania (Berglund et al.1998 and 2004, Bakke 2002), most parties can be structured along 
this axis.  
 
Compared to the rest of post-communist Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), and especially to 
its Baltic neighbours, Lithuania was said to have a stable party system after the fall of 
communism (Holm-Hansen 2002: 73). Although the number of relevant parties has increased 
48 
with every election, they have all been nicely structured along a left-right cleavage 
(Jelinskaite 2001: 43). The parties operated in two government coalition blocks. The reformed 
ex-communist party, Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDDP) was the leading party of 
the left. The largest party representing the right was the National Opposition Movement 
Sajudis, later Homeland Union (TS) (Holm-Hansen 2002: 86). In addition, each block 
consisted of smaller junior partners. The support for the different parties and the government 
coalitions were highly volatile, and especially the burden of incumbency seem to affect the 
support for the different parties. The 2000 and 2004 Seimas elections showed that the party 
system in Lithuania by no means is as stable as assumed earlier. 
Interwar era 
Lithuania first experienced democracy and party system formation after the First World War 
when the country got its independent. The peasantry constituted the social basis for party 
competition in Lithuania during the Interwar era. The party system consisted mainly of two 
blocks with many smaller parties. As shown in Figure 3 below, the dominating party of the 
rightist block was the Christian democrats (LKDP), while the Lithuanian Socialist Peoples’ 
Democratic Party (LSLDP), being a merger of Peasant Peoples Party and the Socialist Party, 
and the Social Democrats (LSDP) constituted the leftist block (Zeruolis 1998: 125). Because 
of the large rural population, most parties received a majority of their votes in rural 
constituencies. The Christian democratic block dominated Lithuanian party politics until 1926 
when an electoral alliance of the LSLDP and LSDP won the election and formed a left-of-
centre government. This government was overthrown by a military coup d’etat that same year.  
Figure 3 presents the results from the 1926-election along a left-right cleavage. 
Figure 3: Seimas election 1926 
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Source: Zeruolis 1998: 126 
LSDP (Lithuanian Social Democratic Party), LSLDP (Lithuanian Socialist Peoples’ Democratic 
Party), TPP (National Progressive Party), DP (Labour Federation), LUS (Lithuanian Farmers’ 
Union) LKDP (Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party) 
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The party competition was structured along a religious-secular cleavage and a along property 
questions in the industrial sector and in agriculture. These two cleavages also had a left-right 
dimension. The Christian Democrats, with its off-shoot parties, was instrumental in promoting 
land reforms in the early 1920s. They defended private property rights and advocated 
compensation for expropriated landlords. More important, the Christian Democrats saw 
themselves as the sole defender of Catholic values in Lithuania. The parties of the left 
distinguished themselves from the Christian Democrats by being totally secular and anti-
clerical (Zeruolis 1998: 125).  
The first post-communist elections 
After fifty years under communist rule, Lithuania regained its independency under democratic 
norms in the early 1990s. Results from the first election to the Lithuanian Seimas in 1990, are 
presented below in Figure 4. The opposition movement Sajudis became the largest party with 
more than forty percent of the votes. This faction consisted of many smaller parties, defining 
themselves as left, right, liberal, polish and Christian democrats, having one thing in common, 
the wish to end Soviet communism (Zeruolis 1998: 143). A left-right placement of the parties 
obtaining mandates in 1990 election is presented in Figure 4.  
 Figure 4: Seimas election 1990 
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Source: Zeruolis 1998, Jelinskaite 2001, Bugajski 2002, Holm-Hansen 2002, Duvold and Jurkynas 2004 
 
LKP (Lithuanian Communist Party) LSDP (Lithuanian Social Democratic Party) LDDP 
(Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party) Sajudis (Opposition Movement) 
 
The reformed ex-communists Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDDP) came second, 
receiving just above thirty percent of the votes. Through a favourable election system the 
Lithuanian Communist Party (LKP) managed to keep five percent, but disappeared from 
Lithuanian party politics after the 1990-election. The historic Lithuanian Social Democratic 
Party (LSDP) from the Interwar era, re-emerged and also got around five percent of the votes. 
The election resulted in a broad oversized rainbow coalition government. 
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The 1992-election was a landslide where LDDP won a parliamentary majority with close to 
45 percent of the votes. The Sajudis faction disintegrated, which gave way for the 
establishment of new parties built upon splinter groups originated from Sajudis. All parties 
from the 1990-election, minus LKP, were successfully re-elected in 1992. In addition to 
LSDP, LDDP and Sajudis, a new electoral alliance consisting of three parties, Lithuanian 
Christian Democratic Party (LKDP), Union of Political Prisoners and Deportees (Lpkts) and 
the Lithuanian Democratic Party (LDP), obtained mandates in the PR-election. Some other 
smaller parties were able to receive one or two mandates in the SMD-election. The election 
result is presented along a left-right axis in Figure 5.  
 Figure 5: Seimas election 1992 
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Source: Zeruolis 1998, Jelinskaite 2001, Bugajski 2002, Holm-Hansen 2002, Duvold and Jurkynas 2004 
 
LSDP (Lithuanian Social Democratic Party) LDDP (Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party) LCS 
(Lithuanian Centre Union) LKDP*  (Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party) + Lpkts (Union of Political 
Prisoners and Deportees) + LDP (Lithuanian Democratic Party) LLRA (Lithuanian Poles' Electoral 
Alliance) Sajudis, LTS (Lithuanian National Union) + NP (Independence party) 
 
The parliamentary majority of LDDP was not enough to secure a stable government, by mid-
1995 the party had effectively lost its majority due to splinter groups within its own faction. 
LDDP deputies voted against their own government at several occasions, resulting in three 
different governments during this period (Millard 2004: 137).  
The 1996 Seimas election 
After four politically turbulent years in office, LDDP suffered major losses in the 1996-
election, going from 44 to ten percent. The centre-right parties advanced in this election, 
where Homeland Union (TS), former Sajudis, won the election with just above thirty percent 
of the votes. LKDP, now running as an independent party, and Lithuanian Centre Union 
(LCS) increased their support compared with the 1992-election results. Five parties were able 
to cross the PR threshold; LSDP, LDDP, LCS, LKDP and TS. In addition, many small parties 
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obtained mandates in the SMD-election. Figure 6 presents the results from the 1996-election 
along a left-right axis.   
Figure 6: Seimas election 1996 
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Source: Zeruolis 1998, Jelinskaite 2001, Bugajski 2002, Holm-Hansen 2002, Duvold and Jurkynas 2004 
 
LSDP (Lithuanian Social Democratic Party) ND-WP (New Democracy –Women’s Party) LDDP (Lithuanian 
Democratic Labour Party) LCS (Lithuanian Centre Union) KDS (Christian Democratic Union) LKDP 
(Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party) LLRA (Lithuanian Poles' Electoral Alliance) TS (Homeland Union, 
former Sajudis fraction) 
 
A centre-right coalition government was formed by TS, LKDP and LCS. This coalition had 
an overwhelming majority in the Lithuanian parliament, but the issue of further economical 
reforms was controversial also for this government. The government fell in 1999 and a 
splinter group of TS took office until the 2000 election (Holm-Hansen 2002: 86).  
The 2000 Seimas election 
The 2000-election marked a polarisation of Lithuanian politics. The disparity between losers 
and winners of the transition from communism became more and more evident in the 
Lithuanian society. The polarisation was expressed with a more radical approach and rhetoric 
during the 2000-election campaign. This opened the room for new political contenders who 
confronted the political heritage and economical policy of the established politicians (Degutis 
2000: 6). In the PR-election LKDP and LCS lost all their seats and only managed to keep two 
seats each in the SMD-election. TS went from 31 percent in 1996 to eight percent four years 
later. The leftist block, reorganised into a unified Social Democratic Coalition (SDK)19, 
became the largest party in parliament with 31,1 percent. Two new parties emerged on the 
party arena, Lithuanian Liberal Union (LLS) and New Union-Social liberals (NS-S). They 
challenged the short-lived hegemony of the established parties in Lithuania. The election 
results are presented along a left-right axis in Figure 7.  
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 LDDP, LSDP, Union of Russians in Lithuania (LRS) and the New-Democracy Women’s Party (ND-MP). 
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Figure 7: Seimas election 2000 
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Source: Zeruolis 1998, Jelinskaite 2001, Bugajski 2002, Holm-Hansen 2002, Duvold and Jurkynas 2004 
 
LVP (Lithuanian Peasant Party) SDK (Social Democratic Coalition) NS-S (New Union-Social liberals) 
LCS (Lithuanian Centre Union) KDS (Christian Democratic Union) LKDP (Lithuanian Christian 
Democratic Party)  LLS (Lithuanian Liberal Union) LLRA (Lithuanian Poles' Electoral Alliance) TS 
(Homeland Union) 
 
Together the newcomers LLS and NS-S received almost forty percent of the votes, and brought 
about a third centre-block alternative in the Lithuanian party system (Bugajski 2002: 142). LLS 
was not a new party per se, it competed in the 1996-election as well, but received less than 
two percent of the votes. Before the 2000-election some prominent TS representatives, among 
them former prime minister Rolandas Paksas left TS and joined LLS. This, among other 
reasons, boosted the support for the party (Adomenas 2005: 54). The other newcomer, New 
Union-Social liberals (NS-S) was a totally new party, established by the celebrity attorney 
Arturas Paulauskas after his campaign in the 1997 presidential election. NS-S focused their 
campaign on social security and rural protection programmes by attacking the economical 
policy of the established parties. The party’s success was explained by the populist pragmatic 
approach to politics (Adomenas 2005: 60) and the “Robin Hood effect” of party leader 
Paulauskas (Degutis 2000: 10). 
 
Table 2 below indicates the flow of voters from the 1996 to 2000 election. The electoral 
achievements by the newcomers LLS and NS-S, can be explained by their successful 
mobilisation of voters that did not participate in the 1996-election, and by the capture of voters 
from the established parties. LLS stole mainly from TS, and NS-S mainly from LDDP.  
Table 2: Voter fluctuations 1996-2000 
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Since a majority of the LLS and NS-S representatives never had been employed in political 
state institution before (Jelinskaite 2001: 109), the 2000-2004 Seimas consisted of many new 
politicians introducing a “new political style and approach that differed from the old regime-
dimension, which changed the nature of party competition” (Duvold and Jurkynas 2004: 141). 
The new centre-block parties LLS and NS-S established a government coalition after the 
election, but it fell after nine months due to personal conflicts within the coalition. Then the 
Social Democratic Coalition formed a majority government together with NS-S, which lasted 
until the 2004-election.  
The 2004 Seimas election 
All party factions in parliament reorganised towards the 2004-election. Most parties running 
under the Social Democratic Coalition-label in 2000 merged under the new name, Lithuanian 
Social Democratic Party (LSDP). In the 2004 PR-election, LSDP ran on a common ballot 
with its government partner New Union NS-S with the name “Working for Lithuania” 
(LSDP-NS)20. After suffering heavy losses in the 2000-election, the Christian Democrats 
(LKDP) and the smaller Union of Political Prisoners and Deportees (Lkpts) merged into TS, 
establishing the united rightwing party Homeland Union- Conservatives, Political Prisoners 
and Deportees, Christian Democrats (TS). Internal conflicts within Lithuanian Liberal Union 
(LLS) resulted in a total fragmentation of this party. The remaining members of the different 
centre-block parties, LLS, Lithuanian Centre Union (LCS) and the smaller Modern Christian 
Democrats (Mkds), merged into Liberal and Centre Union (LiCS) before the 2004-election. 
Lastly, the New Democracy party (NDP), one of the junior partners in the Social Democratic 
Coalition from the 2000-election, joined Lithuanian Peasant Party (LVP) and formed the 
Peasants’ and New Democracy Union (VNDS) (Bakke 2002: 85, Duvold and Jurkynas 2004: 
141). 
 
The erosion of the Lithuanian party system is evident in results from the 2004-election, 
presented in Figure 8. One stabilising factor was that all the four abovementioned party 
alternatives managed to obtain mandates in the PR-election. However, the support for these 
party alternatives compared with the last election, was highly volatile. The incumbent 
coalition of LSDP and NS-S went from a collective support of above fifty percent in the 
2000-election, to just above twenty percent four years later. The reorganised TS improved its 
result compared to the devastating 2000-election, and ended up with around 15 percent. LiCS 
                                                 
20
 Full name: Coalition of Algridas Brazauskas and Arturas Paulauskas “Working for Lithuania”.     
54 
achieved just below ten percent, while VNDS obtained for the first time mandates in PR-
election with close to seven percent support nationwide. Again, two new parties successfully 
emerged. Labour Party (DP) and Liberal Democratic Party (LDP21) together received around 
forty percent of the votes. Figure 8 presents the election results along a left-right axis.  
Figure 8: Seimas election 2004 
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Source: www.seimas.lt, www.parties-and-elections.de, verified by Jurkynas  
VNDS (Peasants’ and New Democracy Union) LSDP-NS ( Working for Lithuania) DP (Labour 
Party) LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) LiCS (Liberal and Centre Union) LLRA (Lithuanian 
Poles' Electoral Alliance) TS (Homeland Union) 
 
DP won the election, being the largest party in almost every constituency with around thirty 
percent of the votes, nationwide. This party was established by Lithuania’s richest and most 
famous businessman, Viktor Uspaskich, a former NS-S representative to the Seimas. The 
successful campaign of DP focused upon dissatisfaction with established politicians for 
neglecting the poor Lithuanians. The other newcomer, Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), was a 
result of the different splinter groups within LLS after the 2000-election. Following the 
resignation as prime minister in 2001, due to the breakdown of the LLS-NS government, 
Paksas broke with LLS and formed LDP (Adomenas 2005: 54). The turbulence around Paksas 
did not end here. After winning the presidential election in 2003, Paksas was later impeached 
and forced to resign in 2004 accused of corruption. Supporters of Paksas joined LDP before 
the 2004-election and the party received just above ten percent of the votes. 
 
It was impossible for the established parties to neglect the overwhelming electoral support for 
DP. A broad majority government coalition was established by DP, LSDP, NS-S and 
VNDS22.   
                                                 
21
 Another party ran under the LDP initials in the early post-communist elections. This is not the same party.  
22
 NS-S left the coalition government in April 2006.  
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Summary, Left-Right placement of Lithuanian parties  
The structuration of the party system development in Lithuania is presented along the left-
right cleavage in Figure 9. The figure only includes parties obtaining mandates in the PR-
elections. Black line indicates continuation of party organisation and representation in 
parliament. Dotted line indicates mergers and splits.  
Figure 9: Left-right placement of Lithuanian parties 
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Figure 9 illustrates that the left-right dominance of LDDP and Sajudis (later TS) has been 
challenged by new parties operating in the space between these two parties. It also shows that 
the number of parties obtaining mandates in the PR-election is steady increasing.   
4.1.2 Post-communist cleavage structure  
Although the topic of this thesis is the urban-rural cleavage, it is important to account for the 
other cleavages scholars have found in Lithuania. In the early 1990s, Lithuania was said to be 
the only ex-Soviet republic with a dominating left-right cleavage and a corresponding stable 
party structure, similar of Western Europe. Zeruolis (1998), Bakke (2002), Holm-Hansen 
(2002), and Berglund et al. (2004) found that the socio-economical left-right cleavage was the 
most important for structuring the party contestation in Lithuania. Most parties and 
government alternatives were nicely structured along this axis.  
 
Holm-Hansen (2002: 79) argued that the left-right dimension was found in five other 
cleavages having structural importance in the early phases of Lithuanian post-communist 
party politics. These five cleavages were questions concerning: 
56 
- Political system; democracy vs. authoritarianism 
- Defining the demos; inclusive vs. exclusive nationalism 
- Economical transition; gradual vs. rapid 
- Communist heritage; acknowledge vs. denial 
- Foreign policy; relationship to Russia 
 
Arrangement of the political system was the most important issue up to the approval of the 
new Lithuanian constitution in 1992. One of the main topics was the powers of the president 
and the institutional framework of the re-established independent Lithuanian state. Sajudis 
wanted strong presidential powers building upon the heritage from the Interwar era, while the 
reformed ex-communists, Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDDP) supported an 
institutional framework similar to the parliamentary systems in Western Europe. Definition of 
the demos was related to the status of the ethnic minorities in the country. Here, Sajudis 
represented a more exclusive nationalism, while LDDP was more inclusive in its nationalist 
approach. According to Holm-Hansen (2002: 80) the Lithuanian parties were not very 
different regarding their take on the issue of economical transition. Both Sajudis and LDDP 
were relatively gradual in their approach and focused upon social harmony. One important 
exception was the agricultural sector, where Sajudis favoured speedy reforms and 
decollectivisation. This issue of gradual vs. rapid economical transition developed into 
political questions regarding free market economy vs. welfare policy when the actual 
transition was over. The division between Sajudis and LDDP was further deepened by the 
debate about the communist heritage. Sajudis viewed all elements from the communist 
regime, such as LDDP, as traitors of the Lithuanian nation, while LDDP portrayed itself as 
protectors of the Lithuanian nation under Soviet communism. The relationship to Russia was 
the last cleavage Holm-Hansen saw as central in Lithuanian politics. LDDP was more open 
than Sajudis on further economical cooperation with Russia.               
   
All these cleavages were essentially represented by the two major opponents in Lithuanian 
party politics at this period, LDDP and Sajudis, later Homeland Union (TS). With time the 
questions regarding the political system, the demos, and the communist heritage lost their 
structural capacity in the party system, and economical issues shaped as market vs. social 
security arguments became more central (Holm-Hansen 2002: 80). Bakke (2002: 239) 
suggested a cleavage pattern that corresponded with the ones Holm-Hansen found. The 
economical left-right and the communist heritage were, according to Bakke, the most decisive 
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regarding government coalitions.  
 
Berglund et al. (1998 and 2004) also operated with a cleavage pattern reflecting a left-right 
structuration of the party system between LDDP and Sajudis. In addition they introduced the 
religious vs. secular cleavage, which fitted into the already suggested left-right dimension. 
Berglund et al (2004: 602) operated with the following cleavages in Lithuania:  
- Religious vs. secular 
- Workers vs. owners 
- Social democrats vs. communists 
- Protection vs. free markets 
- Apparatus vs. forums/fronts 
  
The religious-secular cleavage was represented by parties defending catholic values and 
parties attacking religious values, arguing for a secular society (Berglund et al. 2004: 600). 
The Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party (LKDP) and LDDP represented this cleavage. 
Workers vs. owners can be seen as an extension of the already mentioned left-right cleavage 
between LDDP and TS. Social democrats vs. communists was related to a conflict between 
nationally vs. internationally oriented socialism. Here, LDDP, representing the heritage of 
communism, stood against the historical national oriented Lithuanian Social Democratic Party 
(LSDP). The last two cleavages were related to the transition and the outcomes of this 
process. Protection vs. free market cleavage were parties advocating free market policy, 
irrespective of the short term negative effects, while parties wanting to preserve subsidies for 
unprofitable industries, where at the protection side. Apparatus vs. forum/fronts cleavage 
were parties derived from the old communist ruling apparatus or parties representing a direct 
continuation of the early anti-communist fronts (Berglund et al. 2004: 600). In Lithuania 
LDDP and Sajudis represented these two poles.     
 
Zeruolis (1998: 127), with reference to Nørgaard (1996), argued that the left-right divide in 
Lithuania reflected seven issue dimensions. All these issue dimensions had to be taken into 
account when structuring the Lithuanian political landscape, at least in the early 1990s: 
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- Perception of the nation state 
- Religion 
- Land restitution 
- Perception of the Soviet era 
- Industrial policy 
- National dimension 
- International dimension 
 
Zeruolis’ point was somewhat similar to the already underlined assumption made by the other 
scholars. The different issue dimensions corresponded with the left-right cleavage in 
Lithuania, represented by the ex-communist LDDP and Sajudis. The perception of the nation 
state was the same as Holm-Hansen referred to as definition of the demos, which were the 
political issues related to the status of ethnic minorities. Religion could be seen as the same 
religious-secular cleavage as Berglund et al. suggested. The issue of land restitution was more 
interesting regarding the topic of this thesis, the urban-rural cleavage. As Holm-Hansen 
pointed out above, the economical transition only generated one open political conflict in 
Lithuania, decollectivisation of the agricultural sector. Sajudis wanted to remove all traces of 
communism with a rapid transition of the collectivised farm structure. They advocated in 
favour of shutting down all collective farms as fast as possible and impose a restitution of the 
Interwar era owner structure. LDDP was more reluctant and had a gradual approach. It is hard 
to argue that this is the same as an urban-rural cleavage although it obviously will have an 
urban-rural divide. I find this political issue much more related to settlement with agricultural 
owner-structure during communism and not a cleavage between urban and rural economy. 
The issue dimension covering the perception of the Soviet era, correspond with what Holm-
Hansen called the communist heritage or judgement of the past. Industrial policy is somewhat 
related to Berglund et al.’s protection vs. free market cleavage, where the question was how 
fast and how much the industrial sector should be reformed. The last two dimensions, national 
and international, can be viewed as Lithuanian national identity and Lithuania’s relationship 
to foreign countries, with special attention to Russia.         
Summary, cleavages in Lithuania  
Table 3 summarises the discussion about the presence of cleavages in Lithuania. The different 
authors operated with different names of their cleavages or issue dimensions. The seven 
cleavages mentioned in Table 3 incorporate all the 17 cleavages or issue dimensions that 
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Holm-Hansen, Berglund et al. and Zeruolis used. The left-right cleavage involves issues 
connected to the economical transition, workers vs. owners, protection vs. free market and 
industrial policy. The communist heritage cleavage covers all the abovementioned cleavages 
related to the judgement of the Soviet era and communism as a whole. Issues related to land 
restitution and apparatus vs. forums/fronts are integrated into this cleavage. Nationalism sums 
op all the different political issues related to identity and minorities in Lithuania. The 
remaining cleavages should be clear.   
Table 3: Cleavages in Lithuania 
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As shown in Table 3, all authors agreed that party competition in Lithuania was structured 
along a left-right cleavage and a communist heritage cleavage. LDDP was more leftist and 
pragmatic in their judgement of the past, while Sajudis was more to the right and sceptic 
towards elements of the communist regime. All the other cleavages were also divided 
between LDDP and Sajudis, although the authors disagreed about the structural capacity of 
these remaining cleavages. None of the scholars pointed to the structuring capacity of an 
urban-rural cleavage in Lithuania.   
4.2 Urban-rural cleavage, according to Lipset and Rokkan 
The division between rural and urban interests was devoted extensive discussion in Lipset and 
Rokkan’s “Party Systems and Voter Behaviour” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). They recognised 
that under certain circumstances and under certain structures, parties in defend for rural 
economical interests emerged. This cleavage illustrated two essential mechanisms of their 
model; the correspondence between societal development and political interests, and the 
interaction and crosscutting effects of cleavages.  
 
The correspondence between societal development and political interests related to the origin 
of the urban-rural cleavage where “The conflict between landed and urban interests was 
                                                 
23
 Although Bakke (2002) and Berglund et al. (1998) built their classification upon Holm-Hansen and Zeruolis, 
their conclusions are somewhat different. 
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centered in the commodity market” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 21). The division between 
urban and rural interests was a political reaction to the changing role of individual sectors of 
the economy during the Industrial revolution. When the primary producing communities 
entered the national money and market economy, the farmers pushed forward a policy in 
favour of heavier taxation of the expanding urban economies. The farmers’ struggle for 
democracy contained an element of economic opposition towards the expanding urban 
economy. 
 
Regarding the urban-rural cleavage’s potential to affect the already existing cleavage 
structure, Lipset and Rokkan argued that since this cleavage originated from rural economical 
interests it especially affected the structuration of the rural party competition. In addition to 
the centre-periphery cleavage, which of course also had a urban-rural dimension but was 
mainly a conflict evolved around cultural issues, the urban-rural cleavage brought defend of 
economical interests to the rural electorate. This could either strengthen or crosscut the 
already existing cleavage structure.  
4.2.1 Agrarian parties, according to Lipset and Rokkan 
Agrarian parties originated as defenders of the rural economy against urban industry in issues 
like tariff levels for agricultural products (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 47). But this does not 
mean that agrarian parties would emerge wherever there were farmers. Other parties could 
defend rural interests simply because the urban-rural division overlapped with other 
cleavages, such as for instance a religious-secular or the centre-periphery cleavage. Christian 
democratic parties or ethnic minority parties might therefore represent a rural part of the 
electorate, although these parties often represent cultural identity more than economical 
interests of the agrarian sector.  
 
According to Lipset and Rokkan, the organisational expression of the urban-rural cleavage 
varied in Western Europe. The distinct agrarian parties only emerged where the peripheral 
cultural opposition corresponded with and reinforced conflicts regarding rural economical 
issues (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 20). Agrarian parties emerged in countries or regions where 
these four criteria were fulfilled: 
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1) cities and industrial centres were numerically weak at the time of the decisive extensions 
of the suffrage 
2) the bulk of the agricultural population were active family-size farming and either owned 
their farms themselves or were legally protected lease-holders largely independent of 
socially superior landowners 
3)  important cultural barriers between the countryside and the cities and much resistance to 
the incorporation of farm production in the capitalist economy of the cities 
4) the Catholic Church was without significant influence   
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 45-46) 
Cleavage-party relation 
It is worth elaborating shortly on the relationship between these four presuppositions and the 
emergence of agrarian parties. Agrarian parties did not emerge all over Western Europe 
despite the fact that there were numerous farmers in the region24. The concentration of wealth 
and political control in the cities, and the ownership structure in the rural economy were a 
decisive element for the emergence of successful agrarian parties (ibid 1967: 20).  
 
The first presupposition, weak cities and industrial centres at the extension of the suffrage, 
created problems with cultural standardisation during the state and nation building process. 
Few and weak city centres meant that the state could not fully control or penetrate the 
territory. It was easier for the periphery to resist influence from, and to organise political 
opposition towards, the centre. The importance of farmers being freeholders on small or 
midsize farms, the second presupposition, was underlined by Lipset and Rokkan and further 
by Urwin (1980) as a crucial point to explain the emergence of agrarian parties in Western 
Europe. The size of the farms reflected the rural power distribution where small, midsized 
farms meant more equal production units. These farms had no urgent need for hired labour 
force, the farmer and his family could simply do the work by themselves. Thereby they 
avoided becoming employers. The labour-capital conflict did not exist on these farms, which 
had consequences regarding the later mobilisation of the rural working class. In addition, the 
greater concentration of production units, economic power and social prestige, the easier it 
was for the larger landowners to control, mobilise and align with the rural voters. The power 
of landowners gave the farmers potentially greater payoffs of political alliance with the 
                                                 
24
 In Western Europe agrarian parties only emerged in the protestant cantons in Switzerland and in the Nordic 
countries (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 21).  
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landowners, even tough they often represented contrasting interests. The third presupposition 
dealt with the interaction of cultural barriers and economical interests between cities and the 
countryside. Contrasting cultural identity between centre and periphery, and the countryside’s 
general scepticism towards market economy integration, strengthened the periphery’s 
unifying forces in the battle against centre domination. The scepticism towards market 
economy integration was also important to explain the potential rural class division between 
landowners and tenant or freeholder farmers. The landowners did not always share the 
scepticism towards market economy integration with the small-scale freeholder farmers. 
Landowners had large production units and could hire tenant farmers as a source of cheap 
labour force to increase the farming efficiency. Small or midsized freeholder farmers were 
more depended on stable prices on agricultural products and protection from competition.      
Regarding the last presupposition, the influence of the Catholic Church was central to the 
standardisation process led by the centre. Absent catholic authority weakened the centre’s 
control with the societal and political developments in the periphery. The Catholic Church 
was a very crucial political organiser in the society, especially on the countryside. The 
absence of strong Catholic Church opened the rural electorate for other political alternatives, 
for instance agrarian parties (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 44-45).    
 
Although Central and Eastern Europe was not accounted for in Lipset and Rokkan’s model, 
one should notice that the presence of a strong Catholic Church did not hinder the emergence 
of strong agrarian parties in CEE during the Interwar era. Agrarian parties were in some of the 
Catholic countries, such as Poland, Croatia and Lithuania, the most successive, and overall 
larger than agrarian parties in protestant northern Europe. Some of these agrarian parties were 
openly anti-clerical, while others were more redeeming in their approach to the Catholic 
Church (Rothschild 1974, Seim 1994). It is important to be aware of the empirical limitations 
of Lipset and Rokkan’s model.  
4.3 Urban-rural cleavage in Lithuania? 
The four presuppositions of Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 45) constitute the point of departure 
when arguing that an urban-rural cleavage can be evident in the Lithuanian party system. It 
must be remembered that Lipset and Rokkan’s cleavage model was related to their model of 
state and nation building in Western Europe. The cleavage formation process occurred under 
very different conditions in Lithuania and CEE in general than in the Western European 
context.  
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Holm-Hansen (2002: 84), Adomenas (2005: 53) and Zeruolis (1998: 130) stated that an 
urban-rural cleavage was not manifested in parties representing agricultural interests in 
Lithuania. The same conclusion was reached by Bakke (2002: 239) and Berglund et al. (2004: 
602): The urban-rural cleavage was not viewed as having structuring capacity upon the party 
competition in Lithuania.  
 
Respondents affiliated with the parties of the right, the TS-LK and LKDP, feel that right-wing 
parties represent these interests: the other respondents on the whole feel that left-wing parties care 
most about agriculture (Zeruolis 1998: 130). 
 
Out of this one can assume that the agricultural issue did not divide the electorate along any 
party lines. After the fall of communism the countryside has experienced a dramatic drop in 
living standards. Regarding income level and unemployment the countryside lags further and 
further behind the cities. The increasing disparity between urban and rural areas could be 
regarded as a source of salient political division in the country (Duvold and Jurkynas 2004: 
149). 
4.3.1 Lipset and Rokkan’s presuppositions in Lithuania 
The theoretical foundation for the existence of an agrarian party representing the urban-rural 
cleavage in Lithuania is first of all found in the position of the agricultural sector. The share 
of employment in agriculture constitutes potential constituencies for agrarian parties 
(Kostelecky 2002: 104). Regarding the political manifestation of this cleavage, Lipset and 
Rokkan’s four presuppositions can be a guiding line. These four presuppositions are by no 
mean clear, which constitute a problem regarding empirical measurement.  
Weak cities and industrial centres  
According to Lipset and Rokkan, the position of the cities was important for state and nation 
building elites to control its opponents. But what is a weak city and how can it be measured? 
Weak cities can refer to the number of cities, degree of urbanism, city structure, economical 
dominance and so on. All these factors may affect the urban-rural political relationship, but 
the Lipset and Rokkan assumption can be interpreted as follows; the more urbanised and 
industrialised a country is, the lesser the rural economical opposition towards the centre. 
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The heavy industrialisation initiated by the communists changed economical, societal 
demographical structures in Lithuania. After the fall of communism the country has gone 
through agricultural reforms such as decollectivisation and transition to market economy. This 
has overall decreased the number farmers and the importance of agriculture in the economy. 
Still, the rural population constitutes one third of Lithuania’s total population (Lithuanian 
Statistical Department, 2005 census). The pressure towards the agricultural sector and farmers 
overall becoming the transition losers give favourable conditions for an agrarian party 
defending the interests of this group. Table 4 shows how GDP’s share of agriculture has 
decreased in Lithuania since 1994. 
Table 4: GDP’s share of agriculture in Lithuania 
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Family-size farming 
The agricultural owner structure can for instance be indicated by the size and number of 
farms. The rural economical interests generating an urban-rural cleavage presuppose that 
farmers own their farms. Communism as a political and economical system broke down the 
entire owner structure with small family owned farms over the region25. The disruption of a 
continuous owner structure in the agricultural sector is of course not accounted for in the 
Lipset and Rokkan framework.  
 
The collectivisation of agriculture and organisation of rural civil society organisation, 
imposed and controlled by the communist regimes, changed the entire production structure. 
The small family-owned farms were transformed into large co-operations owned either 
collectively by communities of farmers (kolkhoz) or by the state (sovkhoz). The farm was no 
longer a family-owned property to be inherited by the younger generation, but instead a 
gigantic production unit ran according to ideological principals in a system under total state 
and party control (Lie 2004: 497). In addition to change the production structure, the 
collectivisation of the agricultural sector impacted the farmers’ mentality and identity. The 
farmers more or less lost their self-conceit and the traditions connected to the countryside 
culture (Seim 1994: 456). The farmer was no longer connected to his land, but to his work.  
                                                 
25
 Poland and Yugoslavia were exceptions, here most farmers remained freeholders.  
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The agricultural decollectivisation and economic reforms that were initiated right after the fall 
of communism had distributive consequences, especially for the rural economy. The overall 
decline in the region’s GDP after the transition came from recession in the rural economy. 
The dissolving of the collective farms resulted in huge rural unemployment, and the number 
of farmers and agricultural workers decreased dramatically after the fall of communism. 
Therefore, the rural population and the farmers can be considered as the losers of the 
transition to free market economy (Lie 2004: 493, Johannsen 2003: 292 and Tavits 2005: 
288). In the Lithuanian context, the decollectivisation process has been a re-establishment of 
freeholder farming. The farm collectives were dived into smaller units and returned to the 
previous owners from the Interwar era, along the so-called Restitution model. By doing this, 
Lithuania now fulfils the presupposition of freeholder family farmers for the emergence of 
agrarian parties. 
 
The fertile conditions for agrarian parties during the Interwar era do simply not exist today 
because the electorate is not composed of so many potential agrarian party voters. Still, the 
number of farmers, the rural population in general, and pressure towards the agricultural 
sector, constitute a conflict potential for the emergence of agrarian parties. In 2003, more than 
98 percent of all farms in Lithuania were freeholder family farms. The average size of the 
farms was only 2.8 hectares (Lithuanian Statistical Department, Agricultural census 2003: 
11). According to the 2005 census 545 381 Lithuanians were employed in agriculture, or 15,7 
percent of the population (Lithuanian Statistical Department, Agricultural census 2005). Table 
5 below presents percentage of agricultural employment by regions in Lithuania in 2005. The 
share of agricultural employment is lowest around urban regions such as Vilnius, Kaunas, and 
Klaipeda while the share increases in more rural regions.  
Table 5: Agricultural employment by regions 2005 
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Cultural barriers between the countryside and the cities 
This presupposition is maybe the most difficult to measure because Lipset and Rokkan never 
defined what a cultural barrier was. However, one can assume that a cultural barrier is related 
to the different sources of identity between urban and rural communities. This source can be 
language or religion, but also less definitive and measurable elements such as different 
perception of values, “the good life”, national identity and so on. For instance Duvold and 
Jurkynas (2004) referred to “the rural way of life” as a distinct rural feature without saying 
what this is.  
 
Political, economical, cultural and social conflicts have throughout history been strongly 
related to tensions between countryside and cities, not only in Lithuania but the CEE region as 
a whole (Rothschild 1974, Seim 1994). The numerous rural population combined with the low 
level of industrialisation giving agriculture a dominate position, have kept the barriers between 
cities and countryside highly relevant for political conflicts. Farmer’s scepticism and resistance 
to the incorporation of farm production in the capitalist economy of the cities became visible 
during the democratic interlude of the Interwar era when strong agrarian parties emerged all 
over the region, also in Lithuania. The political conflict was further intensified with different 
voting rules between rural and urban constituencies during the Interwar era (Urwin 1980: 228). 
In Lithuania an urban-rural divide has been evident in the two latest presidential elections. In 
the 2002 election, the support for the two main contenders, Rolandas Paksas and Valdas 
Adamkus, divided the Lithuanian electorate along an urban-rural spectre. Paksas scored 
particular well among rural and deprived segments of the population, leaving Adamkus with 
majority in only a handful of urban constituencies (Duvold and Jurkynas 2004: 161). The 
same pattern was somewhat confirmed with the 2004 presidential election between Kazimira 
Prunskiene and Valdas Adamkus. 
 
The rural area in Lithuania has undergone enormous structural changes and modernisation the 
last hundred years. The tensions between urban and rural have increased because of the 
dramatic decrease in rural living standards after the agricultural decollectivisation. The 
suspicion about land commercialisation is also obvious among the rural population in 
Lithuania today (Duvold and Jurkynas 2004: 149) and the urban-rural cleavage should at least 
theoretically have the capability of structuring party competition in the region (Tavits 2005: 
288). 
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Catholic Church without significant influence  
Regarding the fourth presupposition for the emergence of agrarian parties, position of the 
Catholic Church, the measurement of religion’s position is very difficult, but official statistics 
regarding the number of Catholics among the population or church attendance can indicate the 
Catholic Church’s influence in Lithuania. Lithuania does not fulfil the last Lipset and Rokkan 
presupposition since Lithuania is a Catholic country. This can be seen as an argument against 
the presence of agrarian parties in Lithuania, since the urban-rural cleavage might overlap 
with other more dominate cleavages. 80 percent of the population regards themselves as 
Catholics (Holm Hansen 2002: 83, with reference to Samalavicius 1995: 130).  
4.3.2 Urban-rural cleavage as other cleavages? 
The analysis in Chapter 6 can reveal three possible outcomes regarding the presence of the 
urban-rural cleavage: 
• Absence of an urban-rural voting pattern, presumably no urban-rural cleavage 
• Presence of an urban-rural voting pattern, reflecting an urban-rural cleavage 
• Presence of an urban-rural voting pattern, reflecting other cleavages than the 
urban-rural cleavage 
 
The first and second assumption should be clear, the third need some elaboration. The 
presence of an urban-rural voting pattern can mean that this pattern overlaps with other 
cleavages. Since the data sets in this analysis are aggregated structural data, not respondents 
on individual level, the urban-rural cleavage may overlap with other cleavages, such as a left-
right cleavage (Duvold and Jurkynas 2004: 151). Rural constituencies were heavily dominated 
by LDDP, especially in the first post-communist elections. Holm-Hansen (2002: 84) regarded 
LDDP as the party advocating agrarian interest in Lithuania, without referring to this as an 
urban-rural cleavage. The rural dwellers were in many cases former workers from collective 
farms which experienced a drop in living standards after Sajudis and later Homeland Union 
(TS), initiated a rapid decollectivisation process in the early 1990s. They supported a speedy 
transition to market economy, dismantling of collective farm production and re-establishment 
of Interwar era family farm structure. LDDP represented a more gradual approach in this issue 
focusing on welfare and social security for the farmers (Holm-Hansen 2002: 80).  
 
Farmers and rural inhabitants became the losers of the transition and had obvious reasons to be 
suspicious of market economy integration. Since LDDP was softer on decollectivisation than 
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the other parties, they became the defenders of the agrarian electorate’s interests. The typical 
LDDP-electorate was the less educated, rural and ethnic minorities (Zeruolis 1998: 134) or 
described as the “rural and urban poor” (Adomenas 2005: 53). Sajudis, on the other hand, was 
urban in its outlook with anti-protectionist, big-business oriented policies, supported by upper 
age brackets, well educated city dwellers (Zeruolis 1998: 134).  
 
Lithuania can be said to fulfil three out the four presuppositions for the emergence of agrarian 
parties, representing the urban-rural cleavage. One might argue that the social characteristics 
of the Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party’s (LKDP) electorate; less educated, elderly, 
voters in rural constituencies emphasising moral profile and capacity to solve societal 
problems (Zeruolis 1998: 134), correlated with the social characteristics of a would-be 
agrarian party representing the urban-rural cleavage. This can lead to the conclusion that the 
conflict between economical interest of the city and the ones of the countryside overlaps with 
a religious-secular cleavage, as Berglund et al. suggested (1998, 2004). Agrarian parties will 
therefore not emerge because of the presence of Catholic Church and the LKDP. Duvold and 
Jurkynas (2004: 150) did not support the argument that agrarian interests had allied with 
Christian Democratic or conservative forces in Lithuania. Homeland Union (TS), regarded as 
the conservative party in Lithuania, is urban in its outlook, while LKDP enjoyed to a certain 
degree rural support. After the 2000-election the LKDP merged with TS and the religious 
dimension of Lithuanian politics disappeared as an independent party alternative. Jelinskaite 
(2001: 92), with reference to Novagrockiene (1998: 302), argued that despite the fact that 
LKDP mobilised on catholic values, the religious-secular cleavage was not relevant for 
structuring Lithuania’s party politics. The division between transition winners and transition 
losers is probably more sufficient to explain an urban-rural disparity in Lithuania.  
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Chapter 5  
Methodology  
By applying the Reversed cleavage model this thesis will study which parties have 
represented the urban-rural cleavage in the last parliamentary elections in Lithuania. In 
addition to correlation analyses for the three latest elections, a regression analysis is 
conducted on the 2004-election. The assumption is that parties can change as the 
organisational expression of the cleavage, but the cleavage itself, in this case the urban-rural, 
sustains.  
5.1 Data 
The Lithuanian National Electoral Committee provides electoral results on constituency and 
polling district level. The newer the election is the more detailed the information is. 
Therefore, the further analysis focuses mainly upon the last three parliamentary elections in 
Lithuania, 1996, 2000 and 2004, with special attention on the last one. The analysis is based 
upon election results on constituency, regional and district level26.  
Units 
Because of the SMD-election, all 71 constituencies in Lithuania are divided into more or less 
equal sized units regarding the number of voters. This is a problem because the agricultural 
employment data is on district level. Since the 1996 and 2000 elections are not available on 
polling district level, 19 constituencies are combined into seven analysis units comparable 
with the aggregated agricultural employment data. The analysis of the 1996 and 2000 
elections therefore has 59 units on constituency level, while the 2004-election has 106 units 
on district level.  
5.1.1 Urban-rural cleavage 
To identify the urban-rural cleavage in post-communist Lithuania, two variables are applied; 
urbanism and percentage agricultural employment. These two variables will most probably 
overlap; large cities will have fewer agricultural workers because agriculture is naturally 
related to rural constituencies. Still, it is important to include them both in the analysis 
because they identify two separate elements. First of all, the size of the cities can indicate the 
                                                 
26
 Data on polling district level is only available from the 2004-election and this election is therefore more 
accurate than 1996 and 2000 elections, which are on constituency level. 
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economical production structure. In larger cities other economical sectors, such as industry, 
business, productive and social infrastructure in addition to agriculture, can at least 
theoretically have a dominant position. Secondly, the Tingsten’s law on social gravity centre 
(Karvonen and Grönlund 2003: 229), predicts that the dominant social group in a given 
constituency affects the voting behaviour of other social groups as well. A high percentage of 
agricultural workers can for instance affect the voting pattern of the constituency’s city centre.  
 
The analysis between the urban-rural variable and support for parties is itself not enough to 
identify the urban-rural cleavage’s capacity to structure party competition in the 1996, 2000 
and 2004 Seimas elections. Parties representing this cleavage should at least theoretically only 
have electorate representing either urban or rural constituencies, not both. The relationship 
between the parties’ support is important to control and explain the result.  
Urbanism 
According to the Law on territorial administrative division of the Republic of Lithuania 
(passed 19 July 1994), urban is defined as cities or towns with closely built permanent 
dwellings and with a resident population of more than 3.000 of which two-thirds of workers 
are involved in industry, social infrastructure and business27. All other polling districts and 
constituencies are rural. The urban classification is further ascending according to either the 
percentage urban population within the constituency (1996 and 2000), or the number of urban 
inhabitants (2004).  
Agricultural employment 
The Department of Statistics to the Government of Republic of Lithuania provides data on the 
other variable in the urban-rural dimension, percentage agricultural workers. The data is 
aggregated into either polling district or constituency level. The agricultural employment data 
from 2005 is used in all three analyses.  
5.2 Defining agrarian parties 
Without going into the debate of defining political parties (Ware 1996), this thesis simply 
states that parties seek to influence the state through competing in elections. Regarding the 
emergence of new parties, a new party is a party without an independent parliamentary 
faction. Simply stated agrarian parties can be parties that rely heavily upon support from the 
agrarian population where the employment in agriculture relates to the potential 
                                                 
27
 Not all the smaller cities have their own polling district in the 2004-election. They are classified as rural. 
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constituencies of the agrarian parties (Kostelecky 2002: 103). There are mainly four ways of 
classifying agrarian parties (Urwin 1980: 165): 
1) Parties calling themselves agrarian parties 
2) Parties advocating agrarian issues 
3) Parties attracting the majority of farmers 
4) Parties where farmers constitute the majority of their electorate 
 
Lipset and Rokkan’s cleavage model focused upon the structural composition of the electorate 
and viewed political parties as agents acting on behalf of the electorate’s interests and 
preferences. The role of parties as agents acting on the behalf of self-interests were not 
accounted for in their framework, which has consequences regarding the definition of parties. 
All the four abovementioned characteristics relate to parties as representatives of the rural 
economical interests and whether this should be decided by the parties’ profile or the parties’ 
electorate. One of the assumptions in the Reversed cleavage model is that parties are weakly 
organised, are disconnected from the electorate, elite-controlled without ideological liabilities 
and not built upon representation of specific societal interests. This makes parties shifting. To 
define parties as cleavage representatives one should therefore look at the electorate’s 
structural characteristics   
5.2.1 Agrarian parties according to the Reversed cleavage model 
We assume that either the electorate vote along an urban-rural pattern, or they do not. Parties, 
being the organisational expression of the cleavage, can be divided into “Agrarian party 
name”, meaning parties portraying themselves as defenders of agrarian interests, and 
“Agrarian policy”, parties without agrarian reference but with agrarian friendly policy. Figure 
10 illustrates how the agrarian parties might be approached to fit the assumptions of the 
Reversed cleavage model. 
       Figure 10: Agrarian parties according to the Reversed cleavage model 
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The upper half of Figure 10 refers to cases where there is no urban-rural voting pattern.  There 
might be a theoretical potential of having this cleavage, such as for instance numerically many 
farmers, but the electorate do not structure their party preference along this division. Some 
parties may still portray themselves as agrarians, with for instance an agrarian party name 
(Box 1) trying to catch the potential rural electorate.  The situation can also be that no parties 
try to catch the potential electorate evolving form the potential urban-rural cleavage (Box 2). 
No parties portray themselves as agrarians and the electorate do not cast votes along an urban-
rural division. The lower half of Figure 10 refers to cases where the electorate vote along an 
urban-rural voting pattern. Parties can represent this voting pattern by referring to defend of 
agrarian interests in their party name (Box 3), or the party competition can be structured along 
the urban-rural cleavage without having parties referring to agrarian interests in their name 
(Box 4). Still, the electorate identify the party with this cleavage. 
 
The presence of an urban-rural voting pattern is not depended upon a party calling itself 
agrarian, but whether the electorate identify a party defending these interests. Box 3 and Box 
4 here can be regarded as cleavage representatives of the urban-rural cleavage. The cleavage 
representation can be maintained by many different parties, but it is the electorate’s 
preferences that decide the party’s cleavage belonging.  
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Chapter 6  
Analysis 
 
This chapter presents the analysis results of the urban-rural cleavage’s structuring capacity 
upon party preferences in the last three parliamentary elections in Lithuania. The study only 
includes parties obtaining mandates in the PR-part of the elections. The assumed relationship 
of the analysis is presented in Figure 11. The support for parties is viewed according to the 
urban-rural cleavage, identified by urbanism and percentage agricultural employment. 
Figure 11: Assumed relationship of the analysis 
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6.1 Urban-rural cleavage in the 1996-election? 
After winning the 1992-lanslide election, the ex-communists Lithuanian Democratic Labour 
Party (LDDP) suffered a heavy loss four years later. Many Lithuanians, especially in rural 
areas, experienced decreasing living standards during the LDDP government. The rural turn 
out was also lower in the 1996-election compared to the 1992-election (Holm-Hansen 2002: 
86, Jelinskaite 2001: 51, Adomenas 2005: 66). This weakened the support for LDDP. Table 6 
presents the election result for parties obtaining mandates in the 1996 PR-election. 
Table 6: Election result 1996 
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LDDP’s electoral defeat was less evident in the agricultural constituencies of northern and 
eastern Lithuania than in urban areas. The party maintained around twenty percent of the 
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votes in rural constituencies. The Sajudis offspring Homeland Union (TS) became the largest 
party, winning almost all constituencies both in the SMD and the PR-election. TS got 31,3 
percent of the votes and was rather successful all over the country. It gained votes in almost 
every constituency compared with the 1992-results.  
6.1.1 Correlation results 
The relationship between the variables measuring the urban-rural cleavage and party 
preference, are measured by Pearson’s r and Significance level. Since the variables of this 
analysis are metric, the correlation coefficient Pearson’s r is applied. Pearson’s r goes from -1 
to +1 and indicates direction and strength of the correlation between the variables. 0 indicates 
no correlation, while 1 indicates perfect correlated relationship between the variables. +/- 
point to whether the correlation is positive, paired increasing-increasing/decreasing-
decreasing values, or whether the correlation is negative, paired increasing-
decreasing/decreasing-increasing values. Significance level reflects the probability of 
assuming a non-relationship between the variables (Grønmo 2004). In this analysis the 
correlation have to satisfy either 0.05 or 0.01 significance level to be considered as valid. 
Table 7 below shows the correlation results form the 1996-election. The left column, 
containing Urbanism and Agrar, indicates the variables measuring the urban-rural cleavage. 
The upper rows of the table refer to parties obtaining mandates in the PR-election. 
Table 7: Correlation results 1996-election 
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In Table 7, Lithuanian Centre Union (LCS) and LDDP have a correlation significant at a 0.01 
when correlated with Urbanism. The positive correlation between LCS and Urbanism 
indicates a covariant pattern in the increasing size of cities and the increasing support for 
LCS. LCS was a popular party among middle aged, high income, well educated urban voters 
(Zeruolis 1998: 134). It received just above eight percent of the votes in the 1996-election. 
The negative correlation of Urbanism and LDDP in Table 7 supports the assumption that the 
major electoral defeat of this party, compared to the last election,  had an urban-rural 
dimension; LDDP desertion was much higher in urban than in rural constituencies. The party 
experienced major losses especially in the urban constituencies in and around Vilnius, Kaunas 
and Klaipeda, receiving less than ten percent of the votes. In addition it confirms the 
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assumptions of this party being mainly supported by less educated, rural dwellers (Zeruolis 
1998: 134). The pattern is further confirmed in the parties’ correlation with percentage 
employed in agriculture. Only LCS and LDDP correlate significantly at 0.01 level with 
agricultural employment. LDDP correlates positively, meaning that there is a significant 
pattern between increasing percentage agricultural employment and increasing support for 
LDDP. LCS has the opposite result, correlating negative with the percentage of agricultural 
workers.  
 
It is worth mentioning that the election winner TS did not correlate significantly with any of 
the variables measuring the urban-rural cleavage. The insignificant Pearson’s r indicates that 
the party performed well all over the country and that the urban-rural dimension did not affect 
the support for this party.  
Inter-party correlation  
In Table 8 below, the correlation between parties is presented. This is a way of controlling the 
patterns found in the former correlation analysis between variables measuring the urban-rural 
cleavage and parties in Table 7. The support for each party is correlated with the support for 
all the other parties obtaining mandates in the PR-election. Positive correlation indicates a 
covariant pattern between the parties’ support, while a negative correlation indicates a pattern 
of opposite electoral support for the parties.     
Table 8: Inter-party correlation 1996-election 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
** Correlation significant at 0.01 level, 2-tailed.  N= 59 
* Correlation significant at 0.05 level, 2-tailed. 
 
The results form Table 8 shows that it is only the support for LDDP that correlates 
significantly at 0.05 level and negatively with the support for LCS. Increasing support for 
LCS gives decreasing support for LDDP. Although the support for Lithuanian Christian 
Democratic Party (LKDP) and Lithuanian Social Democratic Party (LSDP) correlate 
positively and significant with the support for LDDP, they did not correlate significant with 
Urbanism and Agrar in Table 7. The support for LKDP and LSDP was more equally 
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distributed between urban and rural constituencies. A final point to be made in the correlation 
of the 1996-election is the insignificant results of the election winner TS. The support for this 
party does not correlate significantly with the variables measuring the urban-rural cleavage or 
with the support of the other parties. Out of this one can derive the argument that the electoral 
success of TS was nationwide.   
 
The negative and significant correlation between LDDP and LCS, together with their opposite 
direction regarding Urbanism and Agrar, suggest that these two parties represented the 
opposing sides in the urban-rural cleavage in the 1996-election.    
6.2 Urban-rural cleavage in the 2000-election? 
The growing social and economical disparity in Lithuania became a central political issue in 
the 2000-election campaign (Adomenas 2005: 62). Table 9 presents the 2000-election results 
for parties obtaining mandates in the PR-election. 
Table 9: Election result 2000 
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The incumbent centre-right coalition of TS, LKDP and LCS suffered major losses, only TS 
managed to get re-elected in the PR-election with eight percent of the votes. The Social 
Democratic Coalition (SDK), a united coalition of the leftist parties, became this election’s 
winner with just above thirty percent of the votes. The party performed well especially in the 
Panevezio and Utenos regions, rural constituencies in the north-eastern territories, with over 
forty percent of the votes in the PR-election. It also grew in urban constituencies compared to 
the 1996-elections. In addition, two new parties successfully emerged, Lithuanian Liberal 
Union (LLS) and New Union-Social Liberals (NS-S), together receiving close to forty percent 
of the votes.   
6.2.1 Correlation results 
The polarisation of Lithuanian politics in the 2000-election is also evident in the correlation 
analysis presented below in Table 10. While the correlation between Urbanism and Agrar and 
parties only were significant for LCS and LDDP in the 1996-election, all parties receiving 
mandates in the PR-election were significant in the 2000-election. Table 10 presents the 
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correlation results between the variables measuring the urban-rural cleavage and support for 
parties from the 2000-election.  
Table 10: Correlation results 2000-election 
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As with the incumbent LDDP in the 1996-election, the electoral defeat of incumbent TS in the 
2000-election had an urban-rural dimension, although with opposite direction. The party was 
abandoned in most rural constituencies, going from an average of 25 percent in the 1996-
election to well below ten on a rural average in 2000. The correlation results in Table 10 
indicate that the remaining support for TS was mainly urban. TS correlate significant and 
positive with Urbanism and significant and negative with Agrar. The same pattern, but much 
stronger, is also evident for the newcomer Lithuanian Liberal Union (LLS). The correlation 
analysis supports the view of LLS being most popular among middle class and entrepreneurs 
in the larger cities (Adomenas 2005: 56). The two other parties obtaining mandates in the PR-
election, Social Democratic Coalition (SDK) and New Union-Social Liberals (NS-S) have a 
convergent pattern regarding their correlation with Urbanism and Agrar. Both correlate 
negatively with Urbanism, SDK significant at 0.01 level NS-S significance at 0.05 level, and 
both correlate positively with Agrar, SDK significant at 0.01 level and NS-S significant at 
0.05 level.  
 
The main urban party from the last election, LCS, failed to get represented and the urban 
voters seemed to be shared by TS and LLS four years later. The rural constituencies, mainly 
being dominated by LDDP in 1996, seem to be dominated by two parties, SDK and NS-S, 
four years later. One can argue that in rural constituencies, LDDP’s (later SDK) grip of the 
rural electorate in the 1996-election was faced with competition from NS-S in the 2000-
election. LCS grip of the urban constituencies in the 1996-election, was challenged by LLS 
and  TS.   
Inter-party correlation  
Table 11 presents the correlation results from the intra-party correlation from parties obtaining 
mandates in the PR-election in the 2000-election.  
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Table 11: Inter-party correlation 2000-election 
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LLS’ positive significant correlation with TS, and negative significant correlation with SDK 
and NS-S, strengthens the assumptions of an urban-rural cleavage between these two groups of 
parties. Both TS and LLS performed better in larger cities than in rural constituencies, while 
NS-S and SDK had the opposite result. The correlation result between LLS and SDK is 
somewhat stronger than for the other parties. The insignificant correlation result for NS-S and 
SDK is interesting. Although Table 10 indicated that both parties can be regarded as mainly 
rural, Table 11 reveals no significant pattern in the correlation between the support for these 
two parties. Out of this one might suggest that since SDK performed very well in almost all 
rural constituencies, NS-S’ support was probably more concentrated.     
 
The correlation results in Table 10 and Table 11 suggest that the urban-rural cleavage in the 
2000-election was represented by LLS and TS, being urban, and SDK and NS-S represented the 
rural side.    
6.3 Urban-rural cleavage in the 2004-election? 
The Lithuanian party system disintegrated further with the 2004 election. The party system 
stability of the 1990s seemed to belong to the past. The newcomer Labour Party (DP) won the 
election being the largest party in almost every constituency, close to thirty percent of the 
votes nation wide. The other newcomer, Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) received just above 
ten percent of the votes. It performed well especially in the north-western regions such as 
Telsiu and Klaipedos County. Although all the four established party alternatives managed to 
get re-elected, they were heavily affected by the outcome of this election. Table 12 presents 
the election result for parties obtaining mandates in the PR-election.  
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Table 12: Election result 2004 
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The incumbent coalition of LSDP and NS-S ran under a common party label in the PR-
election and suffered major losses in this election, especially in rural constituencies compared 
to the 2000-election. LSDP-NS went from a collective support of fifty percent in the 2000-
election, to just above twenty percent in the 2004-election. TS ended up with around 15 
percent of the votes. The party’s main support was in urban constituencies in and around the 
larger cities, such as Kaunas and Vilnius, strongholds from the last two elections. Liberal and 
Centre Union (LiCS) received just below ten percent of the votes. The party achieved best 
results in the larger urban constituencies. Peasant’s and New Democracy Union (VNDS) 
obtained for the first time mandates in PR-election with close to seven percent support nation 
wide. This party performed best results in rural constituencies. 
6.3.1 Correlation results  
Table 13 presents the correlation results between the variables measuring the urban-rural 
cleavage and the parties from the 2004-election.   
Table 13: Correlation results 2004-election 
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Urbanism is positive and significant at 0.05 level for TS, and 0.01 for LiCS. This leads to the 
assumption of these parties being mainly supported by urban voters in larger cities. No parties 
can be said to represent the rural side on the variable Urbanism in the 2004-election. 
Regarding the second variable measuring the urban-rural dimension Agrar, the result is 
positive and significant at 0,01 level for DP and VNDS, and negative and significant at 0.01 
level for LiCS. Especially the correlation coefficients for the percentage of agricultural 
workers have strong results for VNDS and LICS, although with opposite signs. Increasing 
support VNDS correlates with rising percentage of agricultural workers, while increasing 
support for LiCS correlates with decreasing percentage of agricultural workers. 
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The insignificant correlation result for LSDP-NS in the 2004-election is interesting because it 
indicates that the urban-rural dimension did not affect the support for the party. As shown 
from the analysis above, both NS-S, in the 2000-election, and LDDP/SDK, in the 1996 and 
2000-election, had significant correlation results as rural parties in these elections. The 
correlation results from the 2004-election rather suggest that rural agricultural constituencies 
to a larger degree correlate positively with support for DP and VNDS.  
Inter-party correlation  
Table 14: Inter-party correlation 2004-election 
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** Correlation significant at 0.01 level, 2-tailed.  N=106 
* Correlation significant at 0.05 level, 2-tailed. 
 
Table 14 confirms in many ways the abovementioned patterns. First of all, DP and VNDS 
correlate positively and significant with each other at 0.05 level. All the other parties, except 
LDP, correlate significant negative with the increasing support for DP. Another interesting 
finding is the strong negative significant correlation between VNDS and LSDP-NS. Since the 
support for VNDS correlated positively with agricultural employment and was significant at 
0.01 level, while LSDP-NS did not correlate significantly with none of these variables, one 
can derive the argument the significant negative correlation between LSDP-NS and VNDS 
can indicate that these two parties competed for the same rural constituencies. In rural 
constituencies with increasing support for VNDS, LSDP-NS decreased their support and visa 
versa. VNDS did not attract urban voters to the same degree as LSDP-NS did and can thereby 
be said to be more rural in its outlooks. The growth of VNDS in rural agricultural 
constituencies can be a result of the decreasing support for LSDP-NS compared with the 
2000-election.  
 
LSDP-NS’ positive significant correlation with TS, and insignificant correlation with LiCS 
support the argument that the urban-rural dimension did not affect the LSDP-NS result. 
Regarding the urban parties from Table 13, TS and LiCS, they correlate positively and 
significant at a 0.01 level. Both of them correlate significant and negatively with DP and 
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VNDS. The negative correlation between LiCS and VNDS is especially interesting because 
both these parties had the strongest, significant and opposite results correlated with Agrar in 
Table 13.  
6.3.2 Regression results  
The quality of the 2004-data opens for a broader study of this election. A regression analysis 
from the 2004-election is presented below in Table 15. The advantage with such an analysis is 
to study the relationship between the independent and dependent variables, and thereby 
assumptions regarding causal relationships. The regression analysis applies, in addition 
Significance level, standardised Beta coefficients to study the relationship the variables. The 
standardised Beta coefficient indicates changes in the depended variable when the 
independent variable increases with one unit, when all other variables are held constant 
(Grønmo 2004).  
Table 15: Regression results 2004-election 
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The results from the regression analysis in Table 15, confirm the same patterns as the 
correlation analysis suggested. Some parties seem to perform better in rural and agricultural 
constituencies than in urban ones, and visa versa. Beta coefficients are only significant for 
Urbanism and the support for LiCS, significant at 0.01 level, and TS, significant at 0.05 level. 
Both Beta coefficients are positive indicating that LiCS and TS increase their support with 
respectively 0,409 percentage and 0,234 percentage if the population in cities increases with 
1000 inhabitants. This confirms the assumptions of these parties being dominate in larger 
cities.  
 
Agricultural employment is significant at 0.01 level for DP, LiCS and VNDS, while 
significant at 0.05 level for LDP. The positive standardised Beta coefficient for DP implies a 
0,297 percentage increase in support for the party when agricultural employment increases 
with one percent. The relationship is stronger regarding VNDS and LiCS. A one percentage 
increase in agricultural employment increases the support for VNDS with 0,373 percentage. 
The support for LiCS drop by 0, 354 percentage when the agricultural employment increases 
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with one percentage. LDP also drop when agricultural employment increases, although the 
result is less significant.  
 
The regression analysis confirms the insignificant result for the variables measuring the 
urban-rural cleavage and LSDP-NS, suggested in the correlation analysis. The support for do 
not have significant Beta coefficients with Urbanism and Agrar in Table 15.  
Inter-party regression 
Table 16 shows the Beta coefficients from the regression analysis between the parties. We can 
thereby see how each party’s support is related to the support for the other parties. Special 
attention is devoted to the parties with significant Beta coefficients in the regression analysis 
in Table 15, since these parties’ support was related to variables measuring the urban-rural 
cleavage. The Beta coefficients indicate changes for the dependent variables when the 
independent variables increase with one unit. The regression results from the 2004-election 
were presented in Table 15, and all parties except LSDP-NS, had significant Beta coefficients 
with either Urbanism or Agrar, or both. LiCS, LDP and TS were urban, while DP and VNDS 
were mainly rural.  
Table 16: Inter-party regression 2004-election 
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The results from the intra-party regression strengthen the findings from the correlation 
analysis. First of all, the support for DP is related to a significant decreasing percentage 
support for LSDP-NS (-0, 268), TS (-0, 224) and LDP (-0, 352), but not for LiCS. LiCS was 
definitively the strongest urban party on both variables in the regression in Table 15. The 
insignificant regression between DP and LiCS weakens the position of DP as a main rural 
party. A one percent increase in the support for VNDS involves a significant decreasing 
percentage support for LSDP-NS (-0,270) and LiCS (-0,224). The interesting here is that 
VNDS was the main rural party in the regression in Table 15 and the insignificant Beta 
coefficients with DP, TS and LDP can indicate that these three parties did not represent the 
urban-rural cleavage in the 2004-election. The negatively significant Beta coefficient between 
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LSDP-NS and VNDS can support the argument made earlier that these two parties competed 
for the same rural electorate. Since LSDP-NS was both urban and rural, while VNDS was 
rural, one can suggest that in rural constituencies where VNDS increased their support by one 
percent, LSDP-NS reduced their support by 0,270 percentage. The growth of VNDS in 
agricultural constituencies can be seen as a result of the decreasing rural support for LSDP-
NS, compared to the 2000-election. The significant positive Beta coefficient between LiCS 
and TS (0,233) can indicate that the support for these two parties are related, but that LiCS’ 
support is more limited to the larger cities. 
 
Combining the results from the two regression analyses for the 2004-election, we can 
conclude with LiCS and VNDS representing the urban-rural cleavage, while DP and TS, 
which were included as rural and urban parties in the correlation analyses, are left out. LiCS 
and VNDS are the only parties with significant Beta coefficients on the variables measuring 
the urban-rural dimension, and at the same time have significant negative Beta coefficients in 
the intra-party regression with each other.   
6.4 Post-communist urban-rural representation in Lithuania 
One should notice that the values of the correlation coefficients of the analyses presented 
above vary. Although satisfying a Significance level of either 0.01 or 0.05, the correlation 
level of especially the 2004-election is weaker than the former two. This can be a result of the 
different number of units and by the different categorisation of urbanism in this dataset. The 
weak results can also be explained by outliers in the datasets. For instance the rural party 
Peasants’ and New Democracy Union (VNDS) got 28,1 percent of the votes in the city of 
Visaginas in 200428. If this unit is left out the analysis, the correlation between Urbanism and 
VNDS is negative and significant at 0.05 level in the 2004-dataset. Another element is the 
design of the analysis. Both the correlation and the regression analyses prerequisite a linear 
relationship between the variables, but the relationship can for instance be curve linear. Party 
support can be related to a certain size of the cities. The different levels of party support are 
not accounted for in this analysis. A party receiving six percent and a party receiving forty 
percent are treated equally. Finally, there are of course some limitations with the aggregated 
datasets applied in this thesis. A further study could for instance include party programs, time 
series data, data on individual level and so on.   
                                                 
28
 The closing of the Ignalina power plant in Visaginas and VNDS’s opposition towards this can explain the 
party’s success in this area (www.vnds.lt, www.delfi.lt 20.03.2006) 
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Concentrating on the results found in the analyses above, one can state that the voters’ party 
preferences alter on the urban-rural cleavage in Lithuania. In the 1996-election LDDP and 
LCS represented the opposite sides of the urban-rural cleavage. Four years later the urban-
rural cleavage can be said to have been represented by four parties; SDK and NS-S were most 
attractive in rural agricultural constituencies, while TS and LLS were successful in the urban 
constituencies. In the 2004-election, LiCS was the urban party. SDK and NS-S were 
abandoned in rural constituencies in favour of a new party, VNDS.  
Table 17 presents a correlation of all urban-rural parties from the 1996, 2000 and 2004 
elections. The support for each party is correlated with the support of the others, but now 
across elections. This can be a way of tracing the urban-rural cleavage in different parties 
through the three elections studied in this thesis.    
Table 17: Correlation of urban and rural parties 
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Most important for the argument raised in this thesis, are the rural parties’ positive correlation 
with other rural parties and their negative correlation with the urban parties, and visa versa. 
The upper left and the lower right sections of Table 17 confirm a pattern of continuous party 
type support with shifting parties. Rural parties correlate positively with the other rural parties 
(upper left), and negatively with the urban parties (lower right). The correlation between 
urban and rural parties is negative (upper right), while the correlation between the urban 
parties is positive (lower right). Some results are weaker than others, such as NS-S, in the 
rural group, and LCS, in the urban group. Some results are particularly strong, such as the 
correlation between LLS and LiCS with a Pearson’s r of 0,907 and significant at 0.01 level. 
Also the correlation between LDDP and SDK is strong, positive with a Pearson’s r of 0,702.  
The Reversed cleavage model suggests that shifting parties are related to the parties’ inability 
to survive as organisations, and not to a fluid cleavage structure. Since parties are weakly 
aligned to the electorate and lack historical baggage, they are incapable of owning political 
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issues. The lack of historical baggage makes it difficult for parties to define new societal 
conflicts into their party substance, because the spatial framework is absent. The shifting 
representation of the urban-rural cleavage in Lithuania can be explained by the constant 
incentives for new parties to emerge because the old parties lack the ability to own the rural 
issue and further to generate new cleavages into their party substance. Although the 
correlation coefficients vary both in strength and significance level, the results in Table 17 
confirm the assumption of the Reversed cleavage model. Shifting parties can represent a 
constant cleavage pattern.  
6.4.1 Many cleavage representatives 
The analysis results, suggesting a pattern of shifting parties representing the urban-rural 
cleavage, show that incumbent parties do not only lose elections, their position as 
representatives of the urban-rural cleavage is continuously challenged by new parties. The 
increasing fragmentation of the Lithuanian party system can be explained by the electorate’s 
dissatisfaction with the established parties in general, and incumbent parties in particular. 
Lithuanian Centre Union (LCS) and Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDDP) were the 
only parties representing the urban-rural cleavage in the 1996-election. In the 2000 and 2004 
elections each side of the urban-rural cleavage was represented by other parties. One might 
state that the rise of New Union-Social liberals (NS-S) in rural constituencies in the 2000-
election reflected a distrust to the former dominate rural party LDDP, and the success of 
Peasants’ and New Democracy Union (VNDS) in 2004 reflected the rural electorate’s 
disappointment with the incumbent NS-S and SDK. Same pattern is also found in parties 
representing the urban side, reflecting a shifting organisational expression of the urban-rural 
cleavage. LCS was the only urban party in the 1996-election. Four years later after being in 
government, it did not even manage to get re-elected; Lithuanian Liberal Union (LLS) and 
Homeland Union (TS) were considered as the urban parties in the 2000-election. In the 2004-
election Liberal and centre Union (LiCS) represented the urban interests. During the last two 
parliamentary elections in Lithuania, the support for these urban parties has been more 
concentrated around the larger cities such as Vilnius, Kaunas, Klaipeda and Panevezys. 
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Chapter 7  
Conclusion 
 
This thesis introduced the Reversed cleavage model to study party system formation along the 
urban-rural cleavage in post-communist Lithuania. The Reversed cleavage model built upon 
Lipset and Rokkan’s framework, but incorporates contextual features from the Modernisation 
approach and the Missing middle approach to fit the post-communist setting. Although the 
model so far has only been applied on Lithuania, the framework should fit the study of 
unstable party systems and cleavages in most post-communist settings. The fact that voters 
change parties frequently, as they do in Lithuania and Central and Eastern Europe in general, 
does not necessary mean that the foundation for cleavages are absent.  
 
The Reversed cleavage model operates with the opposite assumptions of what Lipset and 
Rokkan did. The first assumption is that parties are shifting. Because of weak 
institutionalisation and disconnected organisational alignments between voters and parties, 
due to the communist heritage, the parties themselves become fragile, elite controlled and 
incapable of implementing efficient policies anchored in the electorates’ interests. This 
weakens the parties’ ability to own political issues and to freeze alignments with the 
electorate and further their ability to survive. The lack of historical baggage makes it difficult 
for parties to define new societal conflicts into their party substance, because the spatial 
framework is absent. The founding potential for new parties is therefore always present.  
 
The second assumption of the Reversed cleavage model is that cleavages are constant. 
Societal conflicts could not be organised into political alternatives during communism in 
Lithuania, and CEE in general. This weakened the parties’ ability to solve or define societal 
conflicts. Following the first assumption about parties being shifting and with weakened 
ability to solve political issues they claim to represent, cleavages are not solved or defined by 
the parties. Therefore these cleavages sustain. The identification of cleavages thereby relates 
less to parties because they are unstable, but more to socio-structural characteristics among 
the electorate and their preference of parties.   
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The Reversed cleavage model demonstrates how cleavages can reflect the party-voter 
alignments in a context where party institutionalisation is weak. The assumptions of parties 
being shifting and cleavages being constant, illustrate the favourable conditions for the 
emergence for new parties and the unfavourable conditions affecting parties’ ability to 
survive. The emergence of new parties is advantageous because the existing parties’ weak 
alignments with the electorate. At the same time, these circumstances are unfavourable for the 
survival of any party, exactly because the alignments with the electorate are temporally and 
weak. Parties therefore emerge under favourable conditions, but the conditions affecting their 
survival are more unfavourable. Weak party-voter alignments and the electorate’s 
disappointment with the old parties in general, but the incumbent parties in particular, result 
in a constant incentive for new parties to emerge as cleavage representatives.    
 
By applying the theoretical framework of the Reversed cleavage model, the target of the 
analysis in this thesis was the urban-rural cleavage in post-communist Lithuania. The results 
of the analyses show that the voters’ party preferences alter on the very same dimension, and 
that different parties represent the same cleavage from election to election. The analysis 
results from the last three Seimas elections suggest that party support along the urban-rural 
cleavage in Lithuania can be viewed according to Figure 12.   
Figure 12: Urban-rural cleavage representation in Lithuania 
 
As Figure 12 shows, in each of the three elections different parties seem to represent the 
urban-rural cleavage in the Lithuanian party system. Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party 
(LDDP) and Lithuanian Centre Union (LCS) represented the opposite poles of the urban-rural 
cleavage in the 1996-election. In 2000 the urban-rural cleavage was represented by four 
parties; Social Democratic Coalition (SDK) and New Union-Social liberals (NS-S) were most 
attractive in rural, agricultural constituencies, while Homeland Union (TS) and Lithuanian 
Liberal Union (LLS) were successful in the urban constituencies. In the 2004-election SDK 
and NS-S were abandoned in rural constituencies in favour of Peasants and New Democracy 
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Union (VNDS). The urban constituencies were dominated by Liberal and Centre Union 
(LiCS).  
 
The shifting party representation of the urban-rural cleavage in Lithuania confirms the 
assumptions of the Reversed cleavage model: New parties can emerge along this dimension 
because (1) the old parties lack the ability to own the urban-rural issue by establishing long-
lasting alignments with the electorate, and (2) old parties have problems generating new 
cleavages into their party substance since their party substance itself is blur. Thereby, the 
unstable party system is not a result of voters’ missing perception of cleavages, but rather 
related to parties’ inability to represent these cleavages by establishing long-lasting 
alignments with the electorate. The results of this analysis show that the urban-rural cleavage 
has the ability to structure voter’s party preferences in Lithuania, but the organisational 
expression is fluid since parties are incapable of representing the cleavage over time. 
Therefore, a stable cleavage structure can persist alongside an unstable party system.  
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Statistical data 
 
Agriculture and population data 
The Department of Statistics to the Government of the Republic of Lithuania 
www.stat.gov.lt/lt/ (20.3.2006)  
- Provisional results for the census of agriculture 2003 in the Republic of Lithuania.  
- Census of Agriculture 2005 in the Republic of Lithuania.  
- Population census 2005.  
 
Election data 
- The Lithuanian National Electoral Committee (e-mail: ZeVaig@lrs.lt) www.seimas.lt 
(20.02.2006) 
- Berglund S, Ekman J &Aarebrot F (2004): The Handbook of Political Change in 
Eastern Europe. Second edition. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
- Bugajski, J (2002): Political Parties of Eastern Europe. A Guide to Politics in the Post-
Communist Era. New York, M. E. Sharpe  
- Bakke, E (2002): Sentral-Europa og Baltikum etter 1989. Det Norske Samlaget, Oslo 
 
Election and parties: www.parties-and-elections.de (20.2.2006) 
 
Homepage of the parties: 
DP  Labour Party      www.darbopartija.lt 
LDP  Liberal Democratic Party     www.ldp.lt  
LiCS  Liberal and Centre Union    www.lics.lt  
LSDP  Lithuanian Social Democratic Party   www.lsdp.lt 
NS-S  New Union-Social Liberals     www.nsajunga.lt  
TS  Homeland Union- Conservatives, Political  
Prisoners and Deportees and Christian Democrats www.tsajunga.lt  
VNDS  Peasants’ and New Democracy Union   www.vnds.lt 
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Appendix 
Employment in agriculture:  
“All persons who have been doing farm work for the last 12 months shall be 
indicated. Data on each person was written only once. If the person has several 
functions in the farm, e.g. is both a spouse of the farm holder and a farm 
manager, data shall not be written twice. Observation period can also be shorter 
than 12 months if information for 12 months is provided. Farm work is any 
work related to production of agricultural products and maintenance of their 
characteristics.” 
  (Source: Agricultural census 2005) 
 
Urbanism:  
“According to the Law on territorial administrative division of the Republic of 
Lithuania (passed 19 July 1994) urban population are persons who reside in 
cities and towns, i.e. in densely constructed residential territories with over 3 
thousand inhabitants, of which over two-thirds work in industry, business, 
productive and social infrastructure areas. Territories with less than 3 thousand 
inhabitants are also attributed to towns if such towns were granted the status 
before the law entered into force. Rural population are persons who reside in 
residential areas with no city attributes (settlements, villages and farm-steads).” 
(Source: Statistical Department of the Lithuanian Republic)  
 
Units of analysis:  
Since data on agriculture employment is on district level and election data on constituency 
level in the 1996 and 2000 datasets, these constituencies are combined into new analysis 
units:  
 
Constituency number Name 
47 and 28  Pasvalio - Panevezio and Aukstaitijos 
32 and 33  Silutes - Pagegiu and Silales - Silutes 
39 and 46 Akmenes - Joniskio and Pakruojo - Joniskio 
65,66 and 43 Kauno - Kedainiu, Kauno kaimiskoji and  Kedainiu 
48 and 49 Birzu Kupiskio and Anyksciu - Kupiskio 
53 and 54 Ignalinos - Svencioniu and Moletu - Svencioniu 
55, 56, 57, 
 58,59 and 70 
Sirvintu - Vilniaus, Vilniaus - Salcininku, Vilniaus - Traku, Traku - 
Elektrenu, Kaisiadoriu - Elektrenu and Varenos - Eisiskiu  
 
 
